

[1982?]

The success of global capitalism has depended upon keeping the Third World in line, on the imperial Center's ability to control the periphery, on a stable pattern of North/South relations. In the world political economy, control over the South can take different forms. That is, imperialism or something like global 'class domination' can be insured by different means, different architectures of power. Different technologies. To get a grasp of this, we can take Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* as a model and try to mine his analysis of the development of different social practices of the power to punish, to see what it might yield for the study of imperialism. His historical division between a sovereign and more violent 'negative' form of power and a non-sovereign and yet more 'positive' and productive disciplinary form seems especially relevant.

What stands out in his analysis are two very different conceptions of control — both in its target and its purposes. In the first conception, characteristic of the classical or monarchic period, the power of the sovereign or of a system of sovereignty is expressed through the violence of its punishments. What comes to replace it in the modern bourgeois era is a second form of intervention and discipline, a subtler and more constitutive set of methods in which a multiplicity of bodies are trained and coordinated, increasing their compliant utility in a way that reduces the need for direct punishment. The modern prison system replaces the scaffold.

In the conceptions of power involved, Third World nations in the postwar era seem to be situated in much the same way as the punished or disciplined individuals which provide the focus of Foucault's work. Let's see.

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Here; in a very broad and preliminary way, I want to elaborate the parallels between different conceptions of how individuals are to be controlled and the methods by which the imperial Center has thought to control the Third World's future within the postwar system of world capitalism.

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"where on a scaffold that will be erected there, the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds." ¹

A. CLASSICAL PUNISHMENT

Abandon all hope. It <u>is</u> obey. No future, remember. Modes of production, deduction, donation, oration. (Control needs)!

A close parallel to Foucault's first mode of control is, in the postwar era of North/South relations, dear to the hearts of conservatives, hawks and Cold War fundamentalists, both inside the Pentagon and out. Here, international politics comes equipped with the trappings and nostalgia of sovereignty, of an authoritative global Leviathan, conveniently housed in Washington. An implicit social pact is presided over by this imperial state and held together by juridical notions of national sovereignty and international restraint. Control is centralized, unitary, focussed in a single point, a sovereign Center whose power can be possessed but also lost. If legal subjects form the constituency of sovereign power, the postwar era gives us imitation national subjects, with the agreed-upon structure of international politics and economics acquiring the force of law. Its dictates provide the code by which the behavior of the new

nations of the Third World will be evaluated. When imperial power within the capitalist world retains its monarchic and legal aura, and when a central (imperial) state apparatus takes responsibility for safeguarding public life at the global level, Third World countries confront a fateful choice — either they subject themselves to the Center's sovereignty or else they behave illegally, disloyally.

Under penalty of law. The King Can Do No Wrong. Deduce the peg. Blood gravy monarch.

"In political thought and analysis," as Foucault puts it, "we still have not cut off the head of the king." And the same is true of international relations. In this first conception, sovereign power will be exercised by those who can claim to possess it and exercise it by right — and in the absence of a more institutionalized authority at the global level, this means the imperial Center, the U.S.A. Power radiates outward and control functions like a miniaturization of the monarchic court. We have a despotic apparatus of control. The position of the imperial Center, expecting allegiance, determines the shape of the international political process and provides a point of absolutelness, a compass. Yet control over the periphery is not possible without grand and deliberate acts on the part of the sovereign. Right must be backed up by might.

View-finder magnetized by what is not possible. Domain privilege. Dispossess the public. Wayward dead center. Loyalty decline. So, I'm damaged & you're authoritarian, that's your basic relationship.

In conservative doctrine, this control presents itself as a life and death matter since it implicates the sovereign's (or the empire's) ability to defend itself. It is also either personalized, in the figure of the King, or else nationalized, in the figure of the imperial Center and its 'national security' needs confronted with criminal encroachments. When the law is transgressed or basic

expectations are outraged, the basic allegiance to the monarchic center is put into question. Crime breaks the contract; violations appear to invert the power of the king. And power takes these transgressions for its target.

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Hang from a rope until socialism appears. Capital punishment for government officials only. Terrification. Blood is central of failure. We put the spectacle where the head used to be. Hideous in strength was less doctrinaire. Nameplate through terror it operates. Can't reason with a monster. Punishment is what others enjoy.

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Ferocity is characteristic of a sovereign infringed upon, of a legitimate collective order being breached. A certain absolutism can be seen in operation here. If the Center's power is unlimited, so are the punishments meted out in its name — for alleged enemy aggression or subversion, for example. Washington's military sanctions, for example, can be punishment by massive excess of violence — a vengeful and ostentatious terror whose agenda is omnipotence.

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Military vanquishing can display and validate the power of the Center. Control works publicly, scenically, to create an international political order of the spectacle. Yet success depends on great expenditures and real military exertion to fill the ampitheatre with the ostentatious punishments required. Only a truly impressive showing of violence can solve the problems created by the very irregular staging of this theatrical spectacle by which sovereignty triumphs. Here the impermeability of the body of the guilty (individual or nation) needs to be sacrificed in order to safeguard the authority of the king (or the regional peacekeeping claims of the imperial power). Violation of the law and the spilling of blood form a single constellation.

Neutral defilement. Harm that happens. Dress your wound in feelings of isolation.

Designed to deal with exceptional rather than normal phenomena, this apparatus concentrates on the prevention of specific future crimes; it

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declines the job of shaping the overall social environment. It targets acts — misdeeds, in other words — since the nature (and therefore the inner nature) of all the societies involved is not on the agenda of intervention; to a large degree they can be taken for granted. Power punishes crimes, not criminals.

In its international version, states on the periphery are supposed to avoid acting in certain prescribed ways; it isn't necessary that they *be* a certain way. The body politic of the individual country can remain largely untouched. Power merely uses the nation as a convenient spot on which to stage an exemplary semiotics of violence. The peripheral states it fastens on are considered to be already-constituted individuals so that even the harshest treatment is not accompanied by much optimism about the possibility that enemies can be rehabilitated or remotivated. Instead, with their existing motivations intact, they are to be shocked and intimidated into legality.

Shape blood, on consignment. Imperialism works hard for a living.

Success is obedience, externally regulated. In this first 'regime,' power operates externally, applied from the outside or — like the ubiquitous helicopters and napalm — from above. And this makes sense insofar as classical control is merely prohibitive; what it prohibits are affronts to sovereignty, instances of disloyalty. Power operates restrictively, as a constraint, with Taboos and Codes of Law providing the model. It limits, blocks, refutes, prevents, represses, excludes, forbids. It comes clear only in its prohibitions, its grand list of what international behavior is disallowed. Its vocabulary is limited. The clichéd 'no' gets monotonous.

War = a money tune-up. Stiffed in the brutal enough cop on beat does not dispense justice. Hardening armories. That's why the oppressed are so oppressed -they're always in relation to something that destroys. Defoliated hopes of the branding iron. I'm sure the decapitationists would agree.

Specifically, power works through a punitive scenario of harm and

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possible future depredations. Nations (or social movements with national pretensions) can be attacked even if they cannot be transformed. But though power can harm, as violent measures are applied directly and painfully to the body of the offending nation, there is little else that it can do. Blunt and heavy, this negative and juridical machinery cannot penetrate very far beneath the skin. Its positive instructions are quite sketchy. We are reminded of the pre-modern scaffold, the public display of torture in which the law is enacted on the representative body of the criminal. At the extreme, the sovereign can impose the death penalty — eliminating the nation politically, stopping time, and erasing the substance of the crime by erasing the criminal as an independent actor. But what if military victory is ruled out?

Quality reminds us of fear. Rent a scare tactic. Body light deters. Celebrity on the object. Obituary by comparison. Material life can kill again. Fires are fought by constructing a coward. Constant cause of contagion.

Success will supposedly be achieved because punishment can celebrate and validate the sovereign's power by making a spectacle of itself, by directly inscribing the signs of its effectiveness on the offending individual. Ready at their receivers, national elites can pick up the transmissions of the law through the ritual marks left on the condemned. Death threats provide the currency of power: the social body of the attacked Third World 'citizens' will serve as a symbol, showing its scars to others as photographed or visited demonstrations. By displaying the signs of domination in spectacular fashion, an image of omnipotence is created by their very excess. Control rests upon a signifying practice, achieving its results from the force of example. Subjection is staged with signs, with a bloody representation.

The kiss of reform. Inexact surgery. Arrogant obedience. Exposure of the puppets is threatening the puppeteers.

Troubles. This first, 'classical' mode of military control is problemat-

ic, even from the perspective of the executioners. The need for displays of unbridled violence suggests a serious deficiency in this methodology — especially for the statesmen at the Center, hedged in by all the hesitations appropriate to a nuclear age. Prohibitions can sometimes prevent countries or social movements from doing what the Center does not want them to do, but this arrangement is helpless to shape behavior in a more constructive way. A violent revengeful power leaves too many gaps and discontinuities which call out for compensation. A vicious circle: if only a few breaches can be punished, the punishment must be all the more severe and exemplary. And yet this only increases the costs and the risks which the imperial Center is forced to manage. Although the irregular exercise of this power may result from the impossibility of achieving a more formal administrative management of the postcolonial world, the discontinuities will also generate troublesome opportunities for the adversaries of the Center. Even if power can engineer a mechanical obedience in the short run, it is often, in the long run, only a defiant and embittered obedience, catalytic of rebellion and prone to backfiring.

Look how archaic and fragile this classical program of the conservatives seems to be. However involved with grandeur, the laws are skeletal, unable to penetrate into details, leaving enormous areas of international and domestic behavior overlooked and unattended. So much slips through its net. It is uncreative, unproductive, able to extract a modicum of obedience but never finely-tuned and detailed enough to create an overall order. To avoid these enormous gaps, the individual social body would have to be better known; the internal structuring of Third World societies would have to be mapped more closely. Otherwise, the application of power is too scattered.

Besides, in the face of these uncertainties and doubtful payoffs, the 'overhead costs' of this violence may get out of hand. And the spread of nuclear weapons posts another limit to the official acts of vengeance. If a deterrent is to work without mishap and engage the thoughtful consciousness of rationally calculating subjects, more than a literal military success is needed; official acts must be careful not to overwhelm the original misbehavior which inspired it. Also, just as the presence of the scaffold laid the ground for a violent popular resistance, coercion can breed distaste, a powerful question-

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ing of legitimacy and a dangerous counter-violence. To increase the violence may only breed resistance worldwide or spur a counter-intervention on the part of opposing superpowers or local adversaries which. do not respect the sovereign's rights.

In the post-World War Two era, these changing currents reveal themselves in Washington policy discussion; Critics of a conservative military approach to North/South relations have tended to question the simplicity and literalism of the 'aggression' model, the model of international illegality. The reformism of punishment which emerged in a previous century has also been reflected in the most basic tendencies of official U.S. policy — especially under the auspices of liberals oriented toward 'containment' and 'world order'. Except in periods of crisis, a more evenhanded and globalist deterrence tends to reflect the more moderate consensus at the center of the Center. The 'bomb them back to the Stone Age' mentality becomes a minority view. Excess and literalism in the local application of violence give way, in official doctrine, to a more generalized political effort at the global level (the Cold War as coexistence, the global management of interdependence). Even here occasional violent 'communiqués' are needed and yet, without a monolithic enemy (e.g., Moscow or a centralized World Communism), this more globalist variant of deterrence will not work; it too will prove incapable of controlling the periphery. For the periphery in the contemporary era can only be controlled if it is shaped, incorporated, trained. A prison-house of normalization will come to seem like the only alternative within a liberal political economy at the world level.

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(Instructions to American agents at the Algeciras Conference, of 1905). "The fundamental issue was to change Moroccan society so that the United States (and other rich countries) could transform that culture into a dependent part of the world capitalist marketplace: 'Intercourse with that country demands the existence of internal conditions favorable thereto. Security of life and property; equality of opportunities for

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trade with all natives.., improvement of the condition of the people that will enable them to profit by the opportunities of foreign traffic... and the power to repress subversive disorder and preserve the public peace.... People shall be made in a measure fit and able to profit by the advantages [of being integrated into the imperial system]."²

B. Modern Discipline

Expansion is a social construction and coercive reshaping of reality. Of immediate profiteering. Traditions actually threaten business. Wait for poverty to die down. Too circulationist?

A second, 'modern' mode of controlling the periphery within the established structure of the political economy of the world system is embued with distinctly liberal overtones: faith in the power of markets, economism, developmentalism. Punishment would give way to subtler and yet more comprehensive forms of control. And this control would be interwoven with the world economy and its modes of socialization and imposed learning. In this second constellation of power, the functions of the world political economy itself are supposed to take on clear political implications. A self-reproducing economic system would be the liberal dream come true. And Leviathan stops being a relevant metaphor for describing how this structure works as a system of power. The king can be dethroned. Official discourse at the Center begins to give much more attention to a different kind of order-keeping and environment-shaping — one which takes its shape from the nature and workings of the world market itself.

They just believe in sovereign capital. Machines which can tabulate secrecy. Hardy Boys save the Third World in the comfort of their home.

Power will not merely be exercised from above by familiar sovereign (which means, extra-economic — and therefore more politicizable) entities,

like the Pentagon, Yankee imperialism, the C.I.A., etc. They can create control without the trappings of law and without being centralized or emanating outward in concentric circles from a single point. A successful postwar order will be built as a piece of economic machinery, operating according to the unquestioned dictates of technical reason and able to coordinate the movements of its constitutive units — nations, as details, as cogs. They can achieve a more anonymous. control over North/South relations by multiplying its authorship.

In the post-World War Two system, the recently decolonized Third World gets glossed with this aspiration. Perhaps a stable periphery could emerge, with America's guardianship, carried along by the flowering of an interdependent world order headquartered in the industrial core. An economic system organized around liberal, 'open door' principles might, in and of itself and internally, produce the control mechanisms which could keep the Third World in line. (And Third World nations are more and more directly implicated in the future of world capitalism by this point. They've shed their limited role as sources of raw materials and the appropriation of already-constituted wealth to become key sites of capitalist production. And yet these sites of production (and of the commodification of life) are also prone to politicization — and to the building of antagonistic state power which could end the profitable differentiation of the public and private spheres of social life. To this problem, a liberal model of North! South control is supposed to respond.)

Even money maddens. Laissez isn't fair. Decontrol. Slack off! When are crimes anonymous? I can't hear you, make a mistake. We punish repercussions. Declare war on sloth & nonconformity. Commercialization justifies the derelict. Do you want me to be sympathetic or do you want my money?

Power's dream has gotten more ambitious; now it includes the fabrication of global prosperity and stability as well as peace. The world order liberals, by advancing a new agenda, are putting a set of encompassing norms at stake; social nonconformity or rule-breaking is what needs treatment.

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'Crimes,' from the standpoint of the world system's optimal functioning, more often involve economic disruption or inward-looking and closed forms of mercantilism than they do national aggression or other obvious violations of sovereignty. E.g., placing stiff barriers in the way of profit repatriation, refusing to repay multinational corporations for property that is nationalized, placing political restrictions on trade or access to locally-extracted raw materials, engaging in redistributive or mobilizing forms of politics. The target is not so much the discrete crime as the constant repetitive possibility of deviance. (And if the nonconformity is predictable and likely to be repeated independently across dozens of countries, the force of example or violent representational forms of deterrence are likely to fail. Available external muscle cannot be in enough places enough of the time; it no longer seems frightening enough.)

When related (liberal) methods of social control became dominant in modern Europe, they were framed by a parallel shift from what Foucault has called "a criminality of blood" and violence to "a criminality of fraud" or crimes against property. Likewise, internationally, the growing incidence of less heroic crimes calls for a greater reliance on less heroic punishments. Developmental wrong- turns, insufficient adaptation, abnormalities, delinquency: these hererogenous practices stir the worries and threaten a general decomposition. Little Hitlers are not the target as much as situations typified in the news by the Allendes, Manleys and Mossadeghs of the world. Conveniently, the trend is captured by McNamara's career line, as he moves from orchestrating bombing raids on Vietnam in the 1960s to channeling Third World development programs in the 1970s as head of the World Bank.

Tips for totalizers. Business is not a business. Noun-like surveillance. Mercenaries for hire. If you can't get a stiff, get a foreign leader. Flags of convenience -so what else is new? Looks less malevolent. Support your local grammar. Pluralist disequilibria. Responsible hermits. Middle class saves up to buy its own colony. Psychology becomes multinational.

Control occurs through a national delegation of responsibility in which the *nature* of the individual units has become the main focus of concern. Power is more impersonal, adjusted to fit the nations involved and operating by means of a technology of subjectification which is really a technology of subjection. (It holds as true at the global level that "we must attempt to study the myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral *subjects* as a result of the effects of power."³) The Center's dominion needn't subvert or transcend the sovereignty of the individual. It acts through it, respecting and affirming the national selves (and national governments) which, more and more, are constitutive features of a social structure of accumulation on a world scale. In the liberal view of 'nation- building,' local states become useful. And sovereignty is delegated, partially exercised within nations rather than from a central position above them, raining down exemplary violence.

Time is money. Stable attitudes pump the nation. Who can grow the most organs without any desire to keep them? Too tipico for my communism. I chose to be a slave to increase my self-esteem. Control the dentures and you have them by the dentures.

A world economic system needs to distribute global positions and insure their solidity, not just localize the effects of power on the behavior of a single exemplary victim. International control will therefore need to organize the 'character' and 'sensibility' of its parts — the very nature and habits of Third World societies — and not merely stipulate the international behavior of their governments or their foreign allies. Representation and the orchestrating of imagery give way to a direct and more comprehensive form of punitive intervention which permeates the national 'body social' and uses national political authorities for leverage. After all, national governments can help in the imprisonment of individual social bodies much more effectively than the threat of violence imposed from a distant center.

An overall world political order of bodies will be created through an individualization that normalizes. Deterrence, for example, appeals to a single sovereign repository of rationality, whereas socialization at the hands of the

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world system could serve to create or reinforce an internal (domestic) structure which can install the necessary foundation for such reason. Socialization does not add a constraining superego so much as it fashions an ego and promotes desire. It is constitutive rather than symbolic. The motivation of national states would be constituted in a much less ephemeral way.

Life is to be organized; threats of death or dismemberment are not enough. Individual societies will not be sacrificed or passively imprinted; instead, they are to be fabricated as members of the world system by a global network of power relations, by discipline. Any authoritative messages from on high that can affect the 'will' of Third World nations will have a fragile grasp unless the underlying bodies (or social orders) of those nations are readied. The prerequisite to so- called correct governmental decisions is a managed and disciplined society.

Commerce cleanses. Not responsible.

The flamboyance and exclusions of the first mode of control have left too many gaps. Now, regulation will be more internal and thus more continuous, working through almost invisible micromechanisms of power. Control acquires a more individualized corporeality. Power can derive from the bottom as well as the top, operating almost in miniature, in a more capillary arrangement, insinuating its way deep inside the individual units rather than taking up a secure position outside the borders. Social bodies are to be mapped in a more detailed fashion. Points of contact are multiplied in this nominalism. Control becomes more finely tuned, more polymorphous, ubiquitously emanating from all pores as the social relations of capitalist production seep into the intricacies of each social formation.

Revolution means stability. Well-organized bureaucracies are hard to overthrow. Think rich.., correctional. This is a business, how soon we change. Ambitious repair... Subservient makeup. Revenge ebbs. Don't wanna see no blood. Oooeee!, develop me! Normalize the help. Social change or die. Unrelaxed, self-contained. Social change is not going to be technical. We Shall

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To achieve control over the Third World in the interests of a smoothly functioning global accumulation process, the physical pain of external military sanctions no longer seems appropriate. The itchy trigger finger of the outraged sovereign begins to appear needlessly risky, an antique. Discipline comes in the form of more subtle corrective techniques that reduces the visibility and the provocativeness of the physical effects of power and therefore reduces the danger that an ostentatious use of extra-national force will backfire and leave disorder in its wake.

Criminals are to be transformed — 'developed,' along liberal capitalist lines — rather than vanquished. Military violence would no 4onger be power's constant accompaniment even if it sits pertly in the background. Norms replace laws and help produce the disciplinary (national) individual. As repression gives way to training, control and obedience will become more axiomatic; almost indistinguishable from the socialization process. Nations in the Third World would no longer be reminded of correct behavior by a few selected depredations. No, correct behavior is to be practiced, constantly reduplicated. The bodies are machined, exercised, their movement harnessed in details. The rules of a normalizing international order are to be followed — and learned.

Ventriloquism of slavery. Sunny disposition of exploitability. It's a helpy-selfy! Self is no redeemer. Those who think socialism means government. We need our own spanking. Surplus less frolicsome. Peace detains leash. A bit of psy-war. Lapidary pacification. Money is style in a solid state. Totally modernized head & counterrevolutionary justice. Slip the noose to guarantee slavery. Instead of fighting losing battles, they profit by adapting.

Control would be designed to serve positive pedagogic functions as societies learn to follow national political *authority*, not extra-national military force. Authority is to be internalized and followed more automatically. Power would not function as a constraint, regulating forms of behavior which it is

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unable to influence at their origin. It would actually constitute and define forms of acceptable behavior. As national political identity comes under surveillance, bodies can be politicized in a submissive way. The norms of the world economy would operate as judgments, or evaluations — those of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank come to mind — to be taken individually to heart. As the ideology of liberalism reigns worldwide, publics can come to believe that the chains which bind them are matters of their own free choice.

Penitentiary. Travelogues all the same. If you can't fight & you can't flee. Prisons are the spanking .machines. We Must Know & You Must Pay (Census et Censura). Oppressed are more futuristic. When did the liberals run out of your money? My life as an export platform. Tight money debt bomb. The meek shall inherit the I.O.U. Bring your dreams of harm8ny to meet the tax collector. Dangle debt to strip back nomination. Do-it-yourself bankruptcy-countries don't go bankrupt. The happy molecule of the multinational corporation. Your failures are our investments.

The sequence of international control methods recapitulates the history of punishment. The sovereign's extravagant revenge, first, moderated by the techniques of deterrence with their appeal to a calculating rationality. Second, the prison system — with the world political economy expected to serve as a prison in which much more finely detailed control over actions and incentives becomes possible. In this second stage, societies will find it much harder to 'stay out of trouble'. They are not only expected to refrain from certain acts but also, on the positive side, to develop and 'be' a certain way.

A sovereign jealously guarding its rights dissolves into a system function, a tightly knit web of active shapings. A domestically positioned surveillance (reminiscent of Bentham's Panopticon) is to supercede the harsh extranational punishment of yesteryear. Violence might be able to create silences, but the world system depends on the shaping of speech, of national political discourses and on the active composing of material production. A positive and productive deployment of power will *invest* these bodies to create a useful

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docility and allow for the extraction of surplus value and the dominance of an authentically capitalist model of development and government policy.

Economic capabilities are to be jointly developed with an eye toward the global division of labor. Enhancing the system's productivity will create a global collective good — an idea which fits very neatly within orthodox liberal doctrines of political economy and comparative advantage. But this means making national units more productive — productive of capital, that is — by expanding and harnessing their positive capacities as their bodies are activated, intensified and put to work. If collective improvement occurs, it will occur through the spread of self-improvement efforts, as national governments support the arc of capitalist development by helping to engineer their societies into the commodity form.

As social life is commodified, a pretense of national self-sufficiency can be retained at the political level — a miniaturized sovereignty, in other words. Meanwhile, the self-reproducing tendency of world market forces holds sway (articulated by international economic organizations like the I.M.F. and the World Bank as well as by U.S. diplomacy). The market is authoritativeit seems to articulate the unavoidable 'facts of life'. It sets in motion and helps to institutionalize a constant stream of judgments based on the visibility of the success or failure of nations within the international marketplace and the continuous, almost automatic comparisons which result. Without needing to be told what to do, the individual can take responsibility -for its own normalcy and self-regulation in the face of these global economic currents. And since market success and success in attracting foreign capital depends upon the internal organization of society, surveillance is self-imposed once visibility extends downward into minutiae — specifically, the details of social life that stud the respectable discussions of risk assessment,' 'political stability indicators,' and 'investment climate outlook.' National politics can retain its 'relative autonomy' without harming — in fact, by *contributing to* the progress of accumulation on a world scale. Violence and punishment are now indistinguishable from the operation of pro-corporate economic planning and local administration of a most interventionist sort. The disciplined and disciplinary nationalism of the Third World becomes the form to be taken

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Our self doubt invites the marines. Utopia risks reprisals of defense fat. Social integration failed to make me grow. Rang from a rope until socialism appears.

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Is this second conception of international power anything more than the economistic utopia which expresses the self-delusion of liberalism within the imperial Center? Certainly the self-reproduction of bodily economic mechanisms depends upon political success at the local (national) level. Yet these nationalisms aren't always so well-behaved — especially in the face of popular mobilizations, outside revolutionary support, and the presence of an opposing anti- capitalist superpower. What then?

When these normalizing processes do not succeed, the Third World threatens to spin out of control — or to spin into the partially protective, partially vampirizing grip of the Second World. The sources of the 'problem' form a long list: the unevenness of capitalist development, the crushing spread of the global 'great transformation' of the world into commodification, with the resistances and radicalisms left i. its wake, the appeal of non-liberal and noncapitalist forms of development, the resonance of pre-capitalist communal traditions and values, the presence of an antagonistic center of global military and diplomatic power, the indigenous appeal of revolution, sub-national separatism, religious identification, the impossibilities of a universal capitalist development everywhere in the Third World. Control over the Third World, by the industrialized core of world capitalism by the hegemonic apparatus at its Center, cannot be insured by socio-economic means alone. The Pollyannaism of the liberals stops short. Global integration seems to be inseparable from the continual efforts of the Center to reintervene in order to supplement the normalizing power of market forces or multinational enterprise. And this means reengaging the global political struggle to gain advantages, connections and direct neo-colonial control over local networks of domination.

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When the second, more localized and nationalized mode of domination starts to fail — as in Vietnam in the early 1960s or in Central America in the 1980s - the leadership of the Center is in a bind. It can sit back, wringing its hands, and watch portions of the Third World slip out of the established arrangements and prescriptions of world capitalism. Yet this is unacceptable, because it would undermine the arrangements by which the capitalist social orders at the Center are reproduced. (Reformist critics are prone to forget this.) But what choice does the Center have? In the absence of a profound social transformation at home — a project to which we can bend our efforts' — the Center will still be motivated to maintain control. And in the absence of an enormous constraint imposed by an active public mobilized in opposition, the imperial Center may resort to the conservatism and militarism of external punishment. Rather than let the Third World occupy a new geopolitical space or anticipate a spreading independence from the First and Second worlds; rather than allow a difference, a nomadism, a refusal of incorporation, a non-parallel future, the Center seems most prone to attempt to return to more archaic methods of control and harassment. The supplementary nudges of diplomacy and economic aid give way to larger doses of counterinsurgency, destabilization efforts, boycotts, sanctions and the physical disfiguring of local politics. Blood replaces the cash- nexus.

Notes

1. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), p. 3. See also Foucault's *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Pantheon, 1978) and *Power/Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1980; edited by Cohn Gordon). Also, Bruce Andrews, "The Political Economy of World Capitalism," *International Organization* (Winter 1982), pp. 135-163; "The Language of State Action," International Interactions (1980), pp. 267-289; "Constitution/Writing, Politics, Language, "The Body," L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, Vol. 4 (New York, 1981); and "Self/Writing," *The L=A=N=G=U=MG=E Book* (Carbondale, Il.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984). The italicized phrases at the

start of each subsection of this essay are taken from a recent manuscript, 'I Don't Have Any Paper So Shut Up (or, Social Romanticism,' 1982-1983.

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- 2. William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 154.
- 3. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 98. Or: "The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle."

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