BRUCE ANDREWS

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Surplus Security and the Domestic Paradigm [1980]

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SURPLUS SECURITY & THE DOMESTIC PARADIGM

[1980]

> "... it is not to the great model of signs and language that reference should be made, but to war and battle. The history which bears and determines us is war-like, not language-like. Relations of power, not relations of sense ... "[1]

In what we could call the discourse of foreign policy, the question of security is central. In the process by which foreign policy is made, what often predominates is an official concern about security. The international aims of policymakers are often articulated in terms of national security. In the postwar American case, for example, these may overshadow any self-conscious desire to satisfy the needs of particular domestic groups, any explicit economic or business-oriented reasoning, any explicit electoral calculations, any real awareness of the redistributional effect that foreign policy outcomes may have at the domestic level. When they talk about the use of force, they talk about national security. When they talk about power politics, they talk about national security. What is signified by that talk is the concept of the nation and its interests, taken as a whole.

Where does this leave the analysis of the domestic sources of such non-economic foreign policies? It often appears as if the emphasis on national security is designed to downgrade the very relevance of this question, as if matters would be settled simply by announcing that the "national interest determines foreign policy."[2] Is 'the nation' implied in 'the national interest' all that is needed as a 'domestic source'? Is this the meaning of 'the state' implied in 'state-centric' models of foreign policy? The door opens slightly, but there

is only a wall behind it. The analytic debates continue.[3]

Very often it is unexamined assumptions or a premature consensus that ends up disabling our analysis. This is particularly likely to be the case where explanations of state action are concerned. Here, the nature of security and the whole idea of the national interest get entangled in epistemological issues surrounding the domestic sources of policy and the relationship between state and society. In the discussion that follows, I want to explore some of the conceptual issues that bedevil these debates. Certainly the conceptual categories available to us in the established literature do not inspire the kind of enthusiasm that would preclude the need for further exploration or the search for replacements.

NATIONAL SECURITY & BASIC SECURITY

Two items should run in tandem: the definition of a nation's security and the way in which the character of the nation itself is described. So we must decide where to begin that description. In the realm of security, what is the nature of the domestic referent, how is the nation signified or characterized in the minds of the policymakers? What specific domestic content can be found in the forms of international action?

These are questions which official spokespersons are reluctant to tackle; the more diffuse the answer, the greater its political effectiveness would be. Nor does the simple way in which they use the concept of 'national security' seem adequate; it turns domestic society into an unmarked body, in need of differentiation. To proceed with such a differentiation, we could begin by asking: what would the security of any nation-state consist of? What can be said to be shared in common by states, defining them by this characteristic?

We need some baseline that distinguishes what is general from what is particular in the nations that are being secured. When this is constructed, we can begin to explain why particular policies are carried out, or understand the motivation behind those aspects that are puzzling enough to make us ask about them in the first place. Otherwise, we are possibly going to fall into the trap of mythology,[4] where it becomes nearly impossible to figure out what the

nation consists of, or what 'its' interest would be. No precise mental construction of the nation (or "signified") would exist. Instead there would only be the turbulent air created by the shifts and turns of a *justificatory,* official discourse. For policymakers are often excusing themselves; they are selling policies or garnering support (sometimes, where the degree of a nation's international credibility is linked to the ability of policy to speak with a single national will).

To satisfy this need for a baseline, and to prevent every possible domestic interest from being loaded onto the concept of security and included within its definition, I want to put forward the term *basic security.* Here the broad usage of "security" is differentiated — not by issue-area,[5] but by the implications of failure or success for domestic society. In this way, the conceptual distinctions are designed precisely to accommodate and improve upon the literature on the state and on the domestic sources of policy. *Basic security* would be defined as the protection of the most fundamental requirements of statehood, as the securing or reproduction of those features which define states as members of the international state system (rather than the features which distinguish one state from another). These fundamental requirements might be said to include: first, the maintenance of territorial integrity (pointing to policies that ward off violent attacks on the national territory) , and second, the maintenance of political sovereignty.

The responsibility (*and therefore the explanation*) for a devotion to basic security can be ascribed to the fundamental, defining nature of world politics. As long as the modern international political system retains its status as an anarchical society, there is no real prescription that would follow from such an explanation. Such national concerns are matters of choice only in a very non-idiomatic sense of that term. These are basic necessities, or preconditions for all other concerns and all other roles. The necessity is implicit simply in the state's definition as a member of the modern nation-state system.

This is a limited or even a minimalist definition of 'national' security. Certainly it is much more limited than anything the leaders of countries with great power status would be willing to accept. What comes quickly to mind are all the other points of reference, all the other interests and values at the

level of domestic society that can be used to justify the use of force. We know that statespersons do not limit themselves to policies which attempt to prevent threats to basic security. This is a commonplace. The dynamic of peace. and war in the interstate system, with all of its horrors and attractions, would have a much more subdued texture if states sought nothing more than basic security. The seemingly 'natural history of statecraft' is constituted by more expansiveness than that; even the "security dilemma,"[6] defined this narrowly, cannot account for it.

Some might argue that the focus of statecraft will widen in rough proportion to the quantity of power available to the state actors or to the nation's international position — as if the concept of national security should be equally elastic. If it were, it would respect the ways in which official discourse can take advantage of the notion of national security, even using it to account for acts of expansion or imperial intervention.

This way of broadening the definition needs to be rejected. The broader aims and referents which I have excluded from the definition of basic security are the *differentia* of official concerns. In the style of analysis suggested here, a differentiation does need to be made, but only as a second step. The preliminary definition is abstract. It universalizes. It departicularizes. Once this baseline is constructed, an explanation of individual policy can begin to particularize — without fear of complicity. The making of distinctions, so necessary for explanation, stands apart from that blurring of category boundaries that is so helpful for efforts at official persuasion or for inspiring compliance.

In a policy concerned with basic security, what is signified is a territorial unit with political sovereignty. This is the basic state. Often the signification of policy extends beyond this basic definition and comes to include some of the distinguishing features of the domestic order — for example, its mode of production or ideological cohesion. To characterize the policies that protect those features as 'national' security policies will only confuse matters. Everything is not basic, nor is everything that is not basic simply 'excessive'. Policy is often "overmotivated," but this needs to be sorted out. An encompassing term like 'national security' seems to suffocate rather than illuminate.

It encourages us to accept a premature consensus about what constitutes a strategic necessity versus what constitutes a societal choice.

THE ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL RISK

How can we distinguish between these two phenomena — between the basic necessities of statehood and the more far-reaching concerns of particular societies? Any consensus we reach or any fundamental standard we devise for gauging security will have to rest upon an assessment of risk.

Here we can draw some sustenance from recent discussions of the concept of justice.[7] These center around the question of the design of a just social order, drawn up according to an identifiable set of principles. Any attempt we make to refine the concept of security might take a lesson from this and proceed along parallel lines. What we need is an analogous external standard. This would allow us to compare the implicit standards used by policy makers with a less particularizing baseline that could serve as a guide for explaining individual foreign policies.

In developing a conceptual model of justice, John Rawls first constructs a hypothetical "original position". In this position, members of society would come to agree to a set of governing principles that would in turn undergird that society's institutional arrangements. Such agreement takes place under a "veil of ignorance" — that is to say, in the absence of knowledge about the special interests, personal positions, or distinctions with which members might be marked. This veil of ignorance therefore allows for the pursuit of a more universalized interest on the part of society. The particular concerns that might unsettle that pursuit are hidden. Uncertainty therefore prevails; there is no way to predict beforehand what the effect will be of the institutional framework that is chosen upon each participant's particular situation in the future. Rawls concludes that, under these circumstances, the individuals would adopt a special rule in order to evaluate the acceptability of the arrangements. This is the "maximin" principle. It would maximize the likelihood that a minimum share of justice would be available to each individual in the future. The logic of this derives from the fact that an individual cannot determine the particu-

larity of her future position in a manner that would make any other decision rule more advantageous.

What Rawls posits, in other words, is the acceptance of a strategy of minimal risk-taking on the part of these hypothetical individuals. These decision rules in regard to justice would safeguard the individuals in a fundamental way. They are constructed in the light of (and offer protection against) the worst possible outcome which could occur to those members in the actual societies that might result. In trying to decide which future system of justice would be most desirable, alternatives are ranked by reference to their worst possible consequences. This minimizes the risks for the individual. At the same time, it forms a rule which is constitutive of the social order that is designed. In its distribution of justice, it will be as abstractly neutral as possible.

By this point in the discussion, the parallel between the understanding of foreign policy and Rawls' analysis of justice may be apparent. To define a baseline for analyzing policies of security, an analogous model is needed. In treating the domestic sources of state action, we can posit an "original position"; this is the basic state, whose leaders concern themselves with the protection of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The absence of particularity this posits is analogous to the veil of ignorance. It closely follows upon the minimal definition of states as members of the international political system.

The relevance of something like the maximin principle now appears. National policy alternatives, or alternative arrays of broad policy orientations, could be ranked by the degree to which they affect the likelihood of the worst possible outcome. Rules capable of governing this basic policy choice would be needed. As they guard themselves against being disastrously disadvantaged, a baseline is posited: state actors will want to minimize risk. They would therefore structure policy so that it protects them, if possible, against the worst possible situations likely to arise in the world environment. This would encompass actions designed to guard against actual physical attack on the national territory or wholesale loss of political integrity.

In this conception, behavior is oriented by reference to the most unfavorable contingency in order to minimize the likelihood of its occurrence. In

noneconomic foreign policy, such a minimization of risk would often make for. a quite limited and non-interventionist policy, especially for the superpowers. The reason is clear: most junctures, however undesirable, would still not bring on the worst possible outcome (the outbreak of nuclear war, for example) except under the most extravagantly hypothetical of scenarios. Where there is no direct military connection to a threatened basic security, the state actors will require some additional source of motivation before acting.

The other side of the coin applies to explanations of foreign policy. Where a concern for basic security is not directly involved, we will need some knowledge of the distinguishing features of the nation's official preferences or utility function before we can make the policies intelligible. The inclination toward a low-risk maximin strategy serves as the baseline. For those in the original position within a Rawlsian universe, it also serves as the standard of rationality and prudential choice, at least of a formalistic kind. For questions of justice, this original position parallels the concept of basic security.

Now, the most striking part of such an analysis is the way it departicularizes states. It abstracts away any special purposes or desires of policymakers that go beyond the search for basic security. It therefore abstracts away from all of the substantive variety of domestic motivations. It turns its gaze at least momentarily away from all the concrete results of those historical developments that underprop particular national psychologies or conceptions of interest. A veil of ignorance is cast over the special features of the nation's political economy, class structure, political institutions, as well as of the interests of the groups which comprise the governing coalition. Even though official choices will be inflected by these domestic features, except perhaps in extreme cases of threats to national survival, the distinctions are needed.

An analytic procedure like this is naturally open to criticism. If we assume that providing for basic security constitutes a rational choice — in extending the Rawlsian parallel — haven't we smuggled into the formal picture some assumptions about "the special features of [individual] psychology"[8]? Is this what now stands disguised as rationality? Even in the face of uncertainty, how can rationality at the rational level be reduced to a no-risk predilection for basic security? How typical or intelligible would such a

predilection be? Would any nation really be satisfied with this, if more could be achieved or if there were an attractive chance that more could be achieved? Perhaps a moderate-risk strategy, one which simultaneously increases the risk of greater losses but at the same time expands the possibility of greater gains, would be more characteristic. As one critic notes:

> Rawlsian man in the original position is finally a strikingly lugubrious creature: unwilling to enter a situation that promises success because it also promises failure, unwilling to risk winning because he feels doomed to losing, ready for the worst because he cannot imagine the best, content with security and the knowledge that he will be no worse off than anyone else because he dares not risk freedom and the possibility that he will be better off — all under the guise of 'rationality'. [9]

This misses the point. With both individuals and states, the concept of the original position helps an analysis begin. It offers a model of formal rationality. It does not end the analysis. It simply posits the existence of a generalized or universalized interest in basic security that can be ascribed to any state, regardless of its leaders' particular utility function or probabilistic calculations. This is derived from the character of the international environment and its inherent strategic imperatives. For the great powers, this basic interest has led to policies of creating or solidifying a balance of power as well as individual (and sometimes counterproductive) efforts at increasing putative power resources. In the nuclear age, it can be said to underlie certain aspects of the superpowers' concern with nuclear deterrence as well as policies, for smaller states, that historically have been centered around the maintenance of alliance ties. Some of the more thorough-going variants of recommendations for a non-interventionist policy — for example, those affiliated with the libertarian tradition — might be limited to fit this conception (these are the sorts of policy recommendations that usually receive the epithets "irresponsible isolationism" or "Fortress America"). At the same time, those who envisage a transcendence of the anarchical qualities of international society can imagine a form of world government coming into being that could, in the event of uni-

versal disarmament, begin to protect the security of states in an altogether different fashion. The key point is that the basic interest, in and of itself, animates a minimal strategy — of doing no more than guarding against the worst possible outcomes.

This entire idea might seem rather innocent. For aren't we all agreed that states have invariably projected a conception of their society's interests and needs that goes well beyond this modest original position? I am arguing only that this fact signifies something distinguishing about the official conception of the domestic features that are involved. This is a two step process. Prior to particularizing the instance at hand, or describing it in a naturalistic way, a 'plumb line' must be set in place. The preliminary task is one of departicularizing. The original position is formalistic, but this is actually its strength. Some of its premises would be very problematical if we were engaged only in a policy-oriented effort aimed at persuasion -for example, the idea that "the person choosing has a conception of the good such that he cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain above the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the maximin rule."[10] But these become part of a clarifying line of distinction when we are involved in explaining why some action is taken.

SURPLUS SECURITY

At this point, a few additional elements have to be brought into the conceptual discussion. One distinction is crucial: between a departicularized or abstract conception of the nation, on the one hand, and a specific social order, on the other. The state actors of a departicularized 'basic state' would define the tasks facing the nation by deriving those tasks from the nature of the fundamental requirements of statehood, which are in turn derived deductively from the unchanging nature of the world political system.

A particularized society, on the other hand, would be expected to project a different set of tasks for the nation's foreign policy. Its state actors' official risk calculus would entail more than just the avoidance of the worst possible outcome. It would project an altered risk calculus, one that is grounded

in more expansive domestic desires and aspirations. This distinction should be acknowledged in the definitions we use. In talking about security, the real question, often neglected, is "*What* is being secured?" or "What is thought to need securing?"

Here we should distinguish between *basic security* and *surplus security.* By saying that a "surplus" is involved in certain conceptions of security, you are clearly distinguishing it from the idea of a self-evident defense of the state's sovereignty or territorial integrity. The latter idea — as a minimal baseline — would be an obvious strategic necessity. The concept of surplus security, on the other hand, can be developed as a way to respond to the question of what is being secured at the *domestic* level – even by expansionist or hegemonic policies for which the term 'national security' seems inappropriate. Surplus security indicates a policy that, in its *signifying*, points beyond the minimal requirements of statehood; it reflects a concern for (or a dedication to) a particular set of national characteristics at home.

The conceptual distinctions which this term highlights are not new. They do bear a resemblance, for example, to the way Abraham Maslow distinguished between the "deficiency needs" of the individual, which must be satisfied first, and what he called the "being needs"[11] involved in the process of growth and self-actualization. The term has a more important lineage in critical theory; in particular, it brings to mind Herbert Marcuse's concepts of "basic repression" and "surplus repression", which he used to characterize the patterns binding together a particular society, in *Eros and Civilization.*[12] This enabled him to roughly gauge the price to be paid, in the quantity of repression needed, for such a society's particular historical features to be reproduced. This is always a price in excess of the demands of basic repression — defined as the amount of repression required for civilization of any kind to persist.

The analogy is clear. Beyond the minimal demands of sovereignty, state actors are faced with an additional set of societal demands — of a historical or quantitative nature. This amounts to a felt obligation to put the state's policy in the service of a specific historical form: a domestic social formation, in other words, with its distinguishing modes of *domination* and *coherence.* In order to secure that particular domestic social order, or to repro-

duce the essential features of the domestic status quo, policy makers must continually set out to prevent certain *international* futures from occurring. These are future scenarios which would not jeopardize the more limited strategic requirements of basic security, even over the long term, but which are often spoken of in terms of their adverse overall domestic effect. The relationship between domestic society and loss of empire would be one example.

The distinction should help us bring together two important topics which are intensively treated in their respective scholarly literatures, but almost never in the same breath. First is the emphasis on the development of concrete social formations, or political economies, taken as totalities. This usually entails an analysis of the role of the state apparatus and its capabilities in regard to the *reproduction* or *steering needs* of society (either nationally or as parts of a world political economy) . Second is the quite different focus that international relations theorists have given to strategic or 'high' policy, perceived in military terms. These two concerns should be on speaking terms. In an explanatory sense, 'realpolitik' might take on a more dependent status in an explanation. The former concern — with steering and reproduction — may take precedence. It may provide the context in which the latter issues can be understood.[13]

Is it possible that this puts priorities the wrong way round? Aren't policies that seem to be involved with surplus security often necessary, in the longer run, even when it comes to survival and territorial defense? (And isn't the "security dilemma" a reflection of this difficulty in decoding the motivation behind someone's policy?) Isn't uncertainty endemic to interstate relations, so that what looks at first like 'excess' might really be a form of long-term prudential behavior — and one that policymakers are reasonably self-conscious about? It should be possible, in individual cases, to sort these matters out, even though there are no cut-and-dried formulas for separating expressions of an actual policymaking consensus from the insincere gesturing of salesmanship. International conditions are uncertain. Policymakers do plan ahead. Nonetheless, conditions of uncertainty are *directed*; they have a differential impact. They implicate certain domestic outcomes rather than others. They attach themselves, as obstacles, to specific national desires and ambitions

while at the same time leaving others unaffected. In a given situation, what is uncertain will not necessarily (or even usually) be the ability of officials to protect the nation's sovereignty and territory by military means. The use of force or the build-up of military power will often be palpably unrelated to this task. With great powers, uncertainty occurs much more commonly over whether the nation can achieve or maintain certain domestic outcomes that extend beyond basic security. The degree to which those concerns extend beyond the definition of basic security would signify — or even quantify — the surplus.

This surplus should not be confused be confused with a question of geographical extension — for example: imperialism, hegemony, foreign control, world supremacy — even though geographical extension may be an attractive means to safeguard that domestic surplus. If the protection of an empire or a network of dependencies is equated with the security of the nation, this equation still needs to be translated into domestic terms. The explanatory "why?" question remains, no matter how elastic the terminology threatens to become. *Why* do policymakers feel that these geographical extensions or additional exertions are needed? Whether or not nations occupy a hegemonic position, and whether or not they behave in the way that diplomatic history suggests they usually behave, the analysis of motivation is not foreclosed. The *nature* and *content* of security concerns will distinguish one nation's foreign policy from another, even if national behavior (in some topographical sense) is similar. Expansiveness should not be homogenized or taken for granted from the standpoint of motivation. Nor can the question of motivation be settled by pointing to the international political system and the distribution of power contained there. That would only shrink the explanatory effort down to the size of questions of constraint and opportunity. Even for relatively weak states, this is not sufficient. For hegemonic powers, it is a mystification.[14] Without a distinction of the sort I have drawn between 'surplus' and 'basic', this danger arises; the concept of security would erase all traces of a policy's domestic content, pointing only to a carefully smoothed surface. Yet beneath the surface, many of the most significant domestic (and particularizing) elements are often being concealed at the same time as they are being presupposed and protected and reproduced by policy.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST AS THE DOMESTIC SOURCE OF SECURITY

The claims of national security may be useful for justifying policy; no matter — the project of explanation demands more. A concept like that of surplus security can serve as an analytic replacement. Yet at this point, a familiar argument comes into view. Can't this notion of foreign policy as a domestic social practice be cast into older, more traditionalist terms? If we want to locate a domestic basis for policy, isn't that what has typically been meant by *the national interest*? Clearly, to complete the changing of the guard, something must be done about this other sovereign remedy. We need a new way of defining it if it is to be of any use in exploring the domestic sources of state action.

The term "the national interest" has a checkered history. Policymakers and policy spokespersons would like to use it as a "super- ordinate criterion"[15] to size up international situations in order to assess the nation's stake in various outcomes. This would prevent a bewildering complexity of domestic values and interests from disarticulating or pulling policy apart after they have tugged at it from a number of different positions. Yet "the content of the national interest is anything but self-evident.... In fact, except within very broad limits, the national interest is no guide to policy at all."[16]

The concept of the national interest has also been used to gain leverage in a series of analytical disputes. Some of these are familiar — for example, the debates between those who urged that policy be coordinated with the national interest rather than distract itself with internationalist dreams or putative global interests. The distinction between idealism and realism (or raison d'etat) is rehearsed. In discussions of foreign aid, for example,[17] the self-regarding interest of the United States is sometimes thought to need protecting against the attractions of benevolence and moral concern.

More recently, the (much disputed) importance of interdependence is thought to confound our ability to apply such a criterion at all. As soon as security concerns are unable to impose a hierarchy or rank ordering of societal priorities upon state choices, the coherence of policy is affected. So are the

classical verities. "The national interest — the traditionalists' lodestar — becomes increasingly difficult to use effectively.... The state may prove to be multi- faced, even schizophrenic. National interests will be defined differently on different issues, at different times, and by different governmental units."[18] Even the assumptions of a unified national actor seeking coherent national objectives come under fire. "For bureaucratic and transnational approaches, the state is not the solid mass of a billiard ball, but an egg whose yolk has been scrambled or whose shell has been cracked."[19]

Extreme formulations of these newer perspectives inspired a critical reaction — from a mercantilist or statist point of view. This viewpoint has restored some of the luster to classical assumptions about a unified state, modeled along the lines of a purposive individual, in pursuit of coherent and consistent objectives. Discussion of "the larger interests of foreign policy" or "the larger foreign policy interests of the nation"[20] is used to counteract the claim that corporate interests might predominate in foreign policy making, or that the state is simply the handmaiden of economic interests at the domestic level. Liberal interest group pluralism and elite-instrumentalist arguments are opposed.

Still, this threatens to short-circuit any explanation of policy goals that would link them up with their domestic sources or specify their domestic content. It is especially troubling when a statist perspective attempts to bypass this obstacle through terminological improvisation. This would appear to be the problem with a "statist interpretation, which sees the state as an autonomous actor seeking to maximize the national interest."[21] It is possible to argue that states pursue the national interest, sometimes very successfully, in the face of resistance from different domestic groups whose particularistic interests must be overcome. But how is the national interest being defined here? — "by inducting a set of transitively ordered objectives from the actual behavior of central decision makers."[22] "The national interest is defined," in other words, "as the goals that are sought by the state."[23] The risk of tautology is overwhelming. As a leading exponent admits, "defining the national interest purely by reference to the preferences of state actors violates common usage that associates this concept with the enduring general goals of society."[24]

At the very least, and in spite of supplementary nuances, this definition would disable the project of explanation. It is too visibly marked, even in its construction, by its battles with those pluralist or instrumentalist arguments which have questioned the autonomy of the state apparatus. "The most satisfactory explanations for why a particular state has pursued one set of goals rather than another will almost certainly involve reference to the society within which the state is embedded.... Thus, [even] a statist analysis is likely, in the end, to reintroduce societal elements to complete its argument, to explain why the state has accepted one set of goals rather than another."[25]

The very term 'the national interest' should imply that policy can be analyzed at two distinct levels: the international goals, on the one hand, and overall domestic interests on the other. Yet still there is something homogenizing about the term that you can see when you look at the way domestic interests are treated. Too often, the idea behind the term is an obfuscation or an occlusion of the differentiated nature of domestic society; sometimes it even resembles an occultation. It fails to notice how important it is to examine the presuppositions of policy that define its content. *And the most fundamental content of a foreign policy is domestic.* It is the official conception of the nation or the character of domestic society that is being advocated or presupposed. This is its political program.

National interest and national security are twinned. Both serve to distract us from any attempts at conceptualizing the domestic sources of state action. Let me give one extended example. In examining postwar American noneconomic policy, there has been a notable readiness to accept the official abstractions at face value. This tendency is reinforced by the strength of the political consensus that has existed around the demand for an activist global policy. In the 1960s, if we look at the debate between supporters and critics of foreign intervention, very divergent opinions do appear over what is needed to protect various foreign interests of the United States and over the specific policies and tactics entailed by that need. Intervention in Southeast Asia, for example, seems either entailed or not entailed. It is a deplorable, possibly an incomprehensible act of official violence, or is it a regrettable but understandable necessity? Nevertheless, looking over these debates, there is still a

great deal of agreement when it comes to specifying the foreign interests that are thought to be vital to America's future. These interests end up forming something like a consensus conception of security. More important, because of assumptions that are made about the domestic consequences of having those foreign interests jeopardized, the agreement amounts to a taken-for-granted political definition of the nation itself.

The normative thrust of many of the most stinging critiques of policy continues to rely on some such consensually-agreed-upon conception of the nation. Most policy discussions are also tethered in the same way. Even so, a critical analysis cannot be satisfied with such an anodyne vocabulary. The question is: what aspects of the domestic social order are felt to be threatened? What is the specific nature of the society that policymakers have in mind to protect? To constantly argue, as critics are prone to do, that government leaders are mistaken, or that they have miscalculated the security needs of the society, may put the political discussion of policy on the wrong footing. It glosses over what may be unavoidable, if latent disagreements about the kind of society in whose service a security policy should be placed.

The distinctive features of domestic motivation that are contained within official purposes have to specified. Otherwise, we cannot distinguish doubts that arise over the efficacy or tactics of policy from doubts that are more deeply rooted in political disagreements and alternative conceptions of how society itself should be ordered. Criticisms get confined to questions of technique or coherence. National security policy then gets defined as a combination of two elements: the national interest, by reference to which international concerns are appropriately guided, and misperceptions or flaws in the decision-making process that seem to account for the deviations from this reference point.

Even if a wide agreement exists on what a nation should do or at least on what interests ought to be protected, this agreement has a domestic basis — an image of a particular society that is signified by this discourse. Any conception of the nation's welfare that goes beyond the presumptions of the baseline would fit into such a category. These agreements on the part of the policymakers are particular forms of discourse about the nature of society. And

these are usually not 'closed' forms, in which the system of concepts (or signifieds) are cut off or disassociated from the actual society, the realm of the referents. The referents are the aspects of the domestic system which are being reproduced, the 'special features' which are open to political definition and, more rarely, to political redefinition.

Very often we hear the official argument that the nation's security would be unavoidably threatened by some future circumstance which therefore has to be prevented — if not at all costs, then at least at most of them. (You could fill a long nightmare with historical illustrations). This form of discourse should tip us off to the possibility that certain surplus security concerns may be receiving a justificatory gloss or account. It is the same account that is appropriately given to the more limited policies of basic defense. Yet in most of these cases, much more is involved than an appraisal of the requirements of basic security. It is not simply a gauge of the direct military threats that would be posed to a minimal definition or characterization of society. Instead, this vocabulary, by its very imprecision, attempts to ground a concern for surplus security in the national interest. Yet there is no such clearcut national interest that can withstand analysis, at least not one that goes beyond the minimally particularized concept of the nation which is involved in basic security. And most often this is not at all what is being referred to. Nonetheless, a clear and uncontestable domestic grounding for policy is often assumed, even when the sorts of risk assessment which are involved go far beyond the baseline. In these cases, once this conceptual vocabulary is accepted, even expansionist or imperial policies can be made to seem less problematical. They take on the qualities of the natural, the universal, the taken-for-granted, the obvious, the tautological, the mythic.[26]

NATIONAL INTEREST, DOMESTIC PARADIGMS

We need another term to replace 'the national interest' . It must suggest the domestic content of a policy; if we use a topographical analogy, it has to reveal the domestic layer beneath the internationally-directed surface, the domestic grounding of an official conception of (surplus) security.

In my own analysis,[27] I have used the term *the domestic paradigm* to help fill the conceptual gap left to us by previous theorizing. If security lies at the heart of strategic policy and of a nation's official world view, the domestic paradigm provides the overarching canopy of meanings with which an explanation must contend. It is *the conceived social system.* It is the official representation or image (or 'signified') of the particular domestic system whose features are going to be made secure by means of a successful foreign policy.

The paradigm includes the conceived features of the social system that are to be reproduced. It is the essential domestic status quo relevant to a particular domain or policy or international role. If you take a case like America's postwar interventionism in the Third World, the government is safeguarding a global role and position that is felt to be connected to the task of protecting those societal features — at home and not merely, or even necessarily, abroad. A set of features and characteristics are being protected, not simply a set of disembodied domestic "values" that derive from the nation's past but which are not structurally located within the present social system.[28]

In a general way, the concept of the domestic paradigm should allow us to talk more frontally about the *domestic future* that is implicated by a particular vision of a desired international milieu, and by the desire to protect a particular international position. It should also illuminate the features of domestic society that are thought to be vulnerable to foreign policy failure — for recent examples, in the American case, the domestic results of failure to quarantine radical social change in the Third World or failure to protect the credibility of the nation's guarantees to its allies. This is not the national interest. To speak of it in those terms will merely lend a fraudulent air of self-evidence to the domestic paradigm that is felt to be at stake.

Once basic security is taken care of, policymakers may predictably incorporate more and more elements of the surplus (the domestic particularization) into the official conception of the nation and therefore of 'national' security. As one example, American leaders in the 1960s pay more and more attention to the Third World as those areas take on more importance — not simply as part of a seamless fabric of national defense, but as symbolic as well as material elements in an integrated world order upon which America's

domestic paradigm is felt to be dependent. The greater the degree to which surplus features are thought to be in need of securing, the more comprehensively the task of domestic steering and social reproduction becomes wrapped up with foreign policy roles. This is another way of talking about the societal function of the state apparatus — where it keeps as few elements as possible of the domestic order from being altered or adversely affected by global change. The reproduction of a domestic social order does involve military defense, as a minimum. But it also entails securing an external environment in which the *constitutive* and *distinguishing* features of the social order can be safeguarded, reproduced, and legitimated. We need a more differentiated concept of security, and the replacement of the concept of the national interest, to encompass these analytic concerns.

In the postwar American case, we can begin to talk about the definition of that domestic paradigm, as long as it is understood that any such effort will be fragmentary and suggestive at best. (Each of the elements proposed can be further subdivided and specified in relation to particular domains of policy or issue areas). The paradigm presupposed by consistent U.S. goals in the postwar era would comprise an official image of what is most important about American society — *a model of its development* — beyond its definition as a sovereign member of the international political system with an identifiable and secure territorial identity. Three elements can be suggested: 1) an advanced corporate capitalist economy. This constitutive economic structure could be specified in terms of: the historical arc or periodicity of American economic development in relationship to the world system, and the process of capital accumulation that helps animate it; the particular constellations of industrial and financial power that occupy a position of relative dominance in a given period; the constitution or fractionation of the capitalist class; the political articulation of the opposition to the interests of that class; the specific needs of maintaining business confidence and the conditions of profitability on which so much depends. 2) a liberal democratic political system at home, with a (comparatively) reduced level of government interference into certain realms of civil society. The constituent features of liberal democracy can be investigated in light of the ideological anchors of American liberalism

and individualism; the relationship between state intervention and the prerogatives of capital; the relationship between economic and political freedom, as well as the desire to avoid more authoritarian solutions to societal problems. 3) an expansive and messianic societal 'self-image' that retains its hegemonic hold at the level of mass opinion — if we can speak somewhat metaphorically about the modes of legitimation and ideological coherence in American society. This could be further specified by reference to longstanding cultural traditions, to compensatory uses of this self-image as a deflection of energy or distraction from social conflict, etc.

This is merely a rough cut. But certainly if we look behind the American stress on 'world order' in the postwar environment, we will see the ways in which such domestic features are implicated, the ways in which they require or motivate certain policies. The ability to remake the world is a luxury related to the growth of a state's power. But this ability does not, in and of itself, create the motivation behind this refashioning. If American interventionism and even much of the dynamic of the Cold War can be understood in terms of world order concerns, this (admittedly, very schematic) portrait of the domestic paradigm might indicate the ways in which we can talk about those international concerns as something more than a narrow desire for material gain, on the one hand, and a disembodied liberal ideology, on the other.

To continue the American example, foreign intervention is often part of a conscious policy of security, just as the policymakers say it is. It is not simply an anachronistic ideological reflex or a victim of uncalculating "other-regarding" messianism. But these are *surplus* security policies. State actors are working 'in the interest of' a specific conception of the domestic society as a whole. Their international goals presuppose it. Unless pressed, their internal discussions take it for granted. This is an official political stance that can be extrapolated out of the state actors' statements and commitments by a process of decoding and corrigible interpretations. It comprises something like a deep structure governing both international desires and international apprehensions.

Something that resembles this procedure is needed if we are going to be able to interpret the international goals of the state. Traditional international relations theory might attempt to derive those goals deductively from the interstate system and its distribution of power, but this makes sense only in cases where basic security is the overriding concern. Neither imperialism nor world order can be subsumed under that heading. More instrumentalist or pluralist approaches might attempt to treat goals by reference to the domestic political process that precedes them. A bureaucratic approach might follow the same epistemological trajectory, only this time operating inside the state apparatus itself. Yet a chronology is not an explanation. It does not place shared purposes into a context in light of which they might seem intelligible.[29]

Actions can often be analyzed as understandable choices of means toward an objective, but the objectives themselves must be explained. Here I would propose recasting the relationship between foreign policy ends and the specific actions that are taken as means to those ends. This ends /means relationship forms what could be called the surface discourse of policy — a surface layer, the domain of technical rationality, situated above the domestic sources of policy. The surface comprises the "first order" ends /means relationship, the one on which foreign policy analysts have so insistently concentrated their attention. Foreign policy objectives, however, do not sit in midair. Our analysis does not need to sit complacently on the surface.

The consistent ends of policy, the shared international purposes of state actors, can be reinterpreted as means toward the achievement of underlying (and often implicit) domestic social purposes — as part of the state's domestic social role. With this conception, we can leave behind the inappropriate imagery of mechanism or reductionism often used to characterize the relationship between state and society. Behind the goals, in other words, we can specify something other than a diachronic sequence of prior domestic 'causes' or an arc of seemingly determinative historical development. We can locate a more synchronic relationship — in which state objectives are *trans-*

latable. They are situated within another underlying purposive relationship.

Immediately, we can see that the concept of the surplus (surplus features of the domestic society that are to be secured) is connected with that of the domestic paradigm and with the social rules underlying state action.

The distinction between this paradigm and the departicularized model of the nation implied by the concept of basic security is precisely analogous to the distinction between basic and surplus security. The surplus involved in surplus security is the specificity of the paradigm: the extent to which we can particularize the domestic system which is felt to be at stake in security policy by identifying its distinguishing features. These distinguishing features form the domestic basis of the policy. The domestic content of statecraft is embodied in a set of social rules. These guide the choices of goals; they help define the state's role. The rules are paradigmatic; they structure and govern what we can call a second order purposive relationship between policy goals and domestic purposes.

Choices of goals can be understood domestically, in other words, once we have gotten beyond the abstractions of 'the national interest'. In the present formulation, domestic rules are *constitutive* of security policy. This is not a model of domestic groups wielding power over state policy in such a way that certain broad international orientations are prohibited while others are imposed due to instrumentalist pressure. The domestic rules, in other words, are not simply rules of domestic political constraint. They define the domestic paradigm that is to be secured by the state's political or security goals.

By constitutive, I mean that they are essentially rules of domestic social success. In the absence of such criteria, there is no easy way to gauge the correctness or inappropriateness of a given policy perspective. Yet for a government to act with a measure of autonomy or independence, such criteria must at least be implicit in the policy. Otherwise, policymakers would be forced to rely on the reception that a policy receives at the hands of relevant political elites or coalitions in order to orient their most fundamental choices of goals. Such a degree of pragmatic 'followership' on the part of the state might be a more typical pattern when it comes to domestic policy. The weak state of America's liberal and pluralist tradition might orient itself in this

radar-like fashion. But security policy is usually thought to be distinctive, and precisely because of the reduced importance of pluralist or instrumentalist or democratic determination. It is more gyroscopic.[30]

In the case of security policy, this undercuts the relevance of some modes of analysis that have been imported from the study of domestic policy and applied, with varying degrees of relevance in recent years, to foreign economic policy.[31] In fact, state actors can gain a substantial edge if they are persuasive in situating a policy in the security realm. Once policies of intervention, or certain policies regarding balance-of-payments or free trade or energy are framed in this way, the level of domestic constraints derived either from the mass public or from obstructive interest groups can be reduced. (This is of course one reason why a distinction between basic and surplus security is so critical. Without it, our analyses of policy are liable to become mere echoes of the policy makers' discourse, with invocations of national security and the national interest taking the place of explanation).

Security policy is usually not an arena in which a series of domestic political pushes and pulls will produce a result, as a pluralist conception might lead us to expect. Nor should we expect the direct intervention of members of a dominant class to be the factor that determines the overall shape of policy goals. [32] The power of the state apparatus itself (relative to constraining domestic groups or electoral worries) is quite substantial. The "multicephalic" dispersion of power, the circumscription of state authority, the quality of underinstititutionalization: these are some of the elements which are thought to characterize America's political system. In many cases, they are said to create a "society-centered" policy network, where the "state is divided and controlled by a pluralistic society."[33] Security policy, however, seems devoid of many of these characteristics. It is as if 'security' can compensate for the fragmentation of power — creating a consensus or at least that "state-centered" policy process which a statist perspective has emphasized.

We can acknowledge the importance of the state's autonomy. We can therefore acknowledge the importance of a hermeneutic reading of policy that pays close attention to the goals and self-understandings articulated by policymakers. Yet this does not mean we have closed the door on the domestic

sources of policy. A security policy may display the relative autonomy of the state, [34] but what is this relative autonomy being used for? The state apparatus has independent political power,[35] but not necessarily independent explanatory power. The state may be an autonomous actor, in that its most fundamental long-range goals are autonomously formulated. But that does not make those goals self-explanatory. Identifying objectives is not explaining objectives. The state is still embedded; in another vocabulary, it is still a sign and a representation.

A tacit concern for reproducing the domestic social system may predominate in the minds of the policymakers. If it does, the debate between those ascribing 'strategic' objectives to the state and those ascribing economic objectives to the state could come to seem misguided. Narrower concerns for economic gain may be overridden by the larger need for system reproduction. And yet, for the satisfaction of the material interests of powerful economic groups, nothing more may be required than to have a state concern itself with reproducing the essential features of the domestic status quo. The realities of surplus security policy, in other words, may demand that we give up some of the theoretical divisions which have been the stock-in-trade of established scholarship.

The self-understandings of policymakers and their way of describing what they do as protecting the nation's security does not, for example, eliminate the economic component of policy so that a strategic component can replace it. If the 'signifiers' of policy discourse are tied to the attainment or avoidance of political effects at the international level, the domestic 'signified' which provides the content might be a social totality, an integrated political economy. If the state has sufficient international power, the domestic society's particular economic structure and needs will very likely be part of the domestic paradigm that is being secured. In a capitalist setting, if the state actors see their task as that of protecting the societal status quo, it will be devilishly difficult to deny that "state behavior is ultimately linked to preserving a set of exploitative economic relationships that benefit a particular class"[36] — unless someone is prepared to deny that such relationships are centrally part of domestic reality. Debates on the explanation of classical imperialism, as well

as over more recent patterns of interstate domination, have not sufficiently acknowledged this. The familiar complaints about theories which attempt to connect capitalism with foreign expansion cannot rest on the invocation of security interests or of strategic or 'political' goals, as distinct from economic ones. The analytic status of strategic objectives cannot go unchallenged. Once we are beyond the dictates of basic security, those objectives are instrumentalized. They can be subsumed, very often, under this larger concern for domestic reproduction.

To carry this analysis one further step, "that domestic order will eventually have to be examined: to specify its features or physiognomy, and its historical formation (both by global currents and domestic conflicts), and, finally, to grasp the process of political coalition-building and maintenance by which certain domestic paradigms are attacked and superceded while others are able to survive intact."[37]

The prescriptive implications of this way of conceptualizing security policy point to official images of the nation and to the actual nature of domestic society, as an arena of conflict, conflict resolution and conflict-avoidance. What look like errors and contradictions in policy may in fact be quite intelligible actions that are connected, through a second-order purposive relationship, to a domestic order in the grip of its own contradictions. Leaving aside the character of the international environment for a moment, fundamental changes in foreign policy behavior would require fundamental changes in national goals. Both the diagnosis and the prescription point in the direction of domestic society. To look forward to fundamental changes in security goals, we must look forward to fundamental changes in motivation and in the character or needs of the domestic paradigm. A full discussion of this matter would require extensive treatment of the changing preconditions of policy success and of alternative theories of the state. But it is probably fair to say that theory and practice point in the same direction. To expect fundamental changes in the domestic paradigm would very likely require fundamental changes in the nature of domestic society itself. There is no conclusion.

NOTES

1. Michel Foucault, *Power, Truth, Strategy* (Sydney, Australia 1979), 33. Yet, see Bruce Andrews, "The Language of State Action," *International Interactions,* VI (November 1979), 267-89. An earlier version of portions of the present essay was presented at the 1978 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association.

2. Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment* (New York 1975), 28.

3. The section head for International Relations for the 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association claims that "the relative impact of state-centric versus non-state-centric explanations of national policy and systemic behavior", is "perhaps the< major debate n the field over the last decade." "1981 Annual Meeting Program, Stephen Krasner," *APSA Program* 1980, 95.

4. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (New York 1972), 109-159.

5. For a recent discussion, see William C. Potter, "Issue area and foreign policy analysis," *International Organization,* 34 (Summer 1980), 405-427.

6. The best recent treatment is still Robert Jervis, Perception and *Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton 1976), chapter 3.

7. The focal point of these discussions remains John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge 1971). It has inspired a bookshelf's worth of commentary.

8. *Ibid.*, 137. Also, see Benjamin R. Barber, "Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measurement and Politics in Rawls," *American Political Science Review,* LIX (June 1975).

9. *Ibid.*, 665.

10. Rawls, *op. cit.*, 154.

11. Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton 1978) also refers to this distinction, largely to cue his notion of a hierarchy of national goals. I want instead to stress its parallel at another level: to a hierarchy of domestic

contents or referents.

12. (Boston 1955), p. 32ff, 79ff. Something similar lies behind the analyses of Norman 0. Brown's *Life Against Death* and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari' s *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*

13. For examples, see Fred L. Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder* (Berkeley 1977), and Alan Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the 'Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus* (Washington, D.C. 1979), as well as the earlier work of Gabriel Kolko and William Appleman Williams.

14. Bruce Andrews, "Explaining and Understanding State Action," paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, February 1976. Krasner, op. cit., makes a related argument against deductive accounts. Yet he also claims: "The distribution of power in the international system is the critical variable in determining the broad foreign goals sought by American central decisionmakers." Op cit. , 15.

15. Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations," in *Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy,* Appendix (U.S. Government Printing Office 1975), Part II, Chapter VII, 64-74. Compare Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power* (New York 1973), chapter 2.

16. Robert Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton 1973), 325, 324.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston 1977), 8, 35.

19. Stephen D. Krasner, "A Statist Interpretation of American Oil Policy toward the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly*, 94 (Spring 1979), 78.

20. As one example, see Gilpin, *op. cit.*, 142-47.

21. Krasner, "A Statist...," *op. cit.*, 94.

22. *Ibid.*, 80.

23. Krasner, *Defending, op. cit.*, 12.

24. *Ibid.*, 43.

25. Krasner, "A Statist... ," *op. cit.*, 95. A refreshing admission. The inability to confidently choose between statist and 'structural marxist' interpretations at various points should itself suggest the need for further conceptual probing.

26. Barthes, *op. cit.*

27. *Empire & Society: Misinterpreting America's War with Asia* (in progress), and "The Language of State Action," *op. cit.*

28. George and Keohane, *op. cit.*, make the distinction between "self-regarding and "other-regarding" interests. Krasner, *op. cit.*, and Packenham, *op. cit.*, following Louis Hartz, Stanley Hoffmann, and others, tend to slight the functional, self-regarding, and structurally-rooted nature of liberal ideology.

29. See Bruce Andrews, "Social Rules and the State as a Social Actor," World Politics XXVII (July 1975), 521-540, and "Explaining and Understanding...," *op. cit.*

30. See Bruce Andrews, *Public Constraint co2d American Policy in Vietnam*, Sage Professional Papers in International Studies (Beverly Hills 1976), and Bruce Andrews, "Representation and Irresponsibility in Foreign Policy," paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, March 1977.

31. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial Countries*, special issue of International Organization, XXXI (Autumn 1977) and "International Relations and Domestic Structures," *International Organization*, XXX (Winter 1976), 1-46; Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, XXXII (Autumn 1978), 881-912; James Kurth, "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle," paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, March 1977.

32. Although, see Laurence H. Shoup and William Mintner, *Imperial Brain Trust* (New York 1977), and Peter Dale Scott, "The Vietnam War and the CIA-Financial Establishment," in Mark Selden, ed., *Remaking Asia* (New

York 1974), 91-154.

33. Katzenstein, "International Relations...", op. cit. , 17.

34. For two recent formulations: Ralph Miliband, "The Relative Autonomy of the State," paper presented at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association; and Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism* (London 1978). I

35. The statist or mercantilist perspectives can lead to a blurring of these distinctions. See Andrews, "Social Rules...", *op. cit.*, on the question of self- referentiality in the state/society relationship. Gourevitch, *op. cit.*, 895, notes that "The difference between the neomercantilists and the state-centered Marxists lies not in their view of the autonomy of the state... Rather it lies in their view of the ends served by the state (national interest for the neomercantilists, partial interests for the state-centered Marxists)... On the role of the state, the interesting conflict at present is that between the neomercantilists, state- centered Marxists, and Gerschenkronians on one side and the liberals, *interdependencistas*, and the economistic Marxists within the dependencia school on the other."

36. Krasner, *Defending*, *op. cit.*, 333. Compare Fred Block, "Marxist Theories of the State in World System Analysis," in Barbara Hockey Kaplan, ed., *Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy* (Beverly Hills/London 1978), 33: "of course, there are always capitalist special interests attempting to get the state to act in their favor, as, for example, the oil companies, lobbying for energy policies that would maximize their profits. But when we are talking about the strategic level, the kind of state policies that rise above specific industrial interests because they are oriented to maintaining the conditions necessary for continued class rule domestically and keeping open possibilities for economic expansion abroad, then such reductionism is unnecessary."

37. Andrews, "The Language...", op. cit. Once policy points back to a specific domestic paradigm, in other words, the construction and maintenance of that paradigm may call for further analysis. And so may the relationship between the paradigm and the actual character of domestic society, for that will tell us something about the 'social rationality' of policy. To acknowledge the importance of analyzing policy in terms of the domestic par-

adigm, however, should help to postpone the attractions of a more reductionist mode of conceptualizing the relationship between society and state behavior.