

BRUCE ANDREWS

POLI SCI

06

Economic Diplomacy  
and the New  
Economic Order:  
Rhetorical Questions  
[1979]

# ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: RHETORICAL QUESTIONS

[1979]

1. Is it better to speak of the need for a new theoretical model in international relations to explain the presumably new occurrence of economic turbulence and mercantilism — or should we be speaking of the need for a better theoretical model to explain old *and* new patterns: like, for example, the standard operation of the political economy of world capitalism as an integrated whole?
2. Is a new model most needed when the hierarchy of nation-state power in the international political system is rapidly changing — or is it needed most to explain stability or the reproduction of the status quo as a typical phenomenon, so that we can understand (for example) the relationship between U.S. hegemony and, the older normative order of liberal trade and investment<sup>1</sup> rather than be surprised as they are simultaneously weakened?
3. Is a new theoretical model most needed to measure tensions among isolable national economic actors in the political order — or do we most need to explain the typical *positioning* and *roles* of national actors within the world system and how those roles are reproduced?
4. To say that international relations theorists have been surprised by a decline in the autonomy of nation-states and now wish to acknowledge the influence of the international system on national units: does

bruce andrews

POLI SCI

this indicate a new problem for us, or does it simply suggest the bankruptcy of older theorizing?

5. We might talk about how the autonomy and ‘impermeable sovereignty’ of the nation-state has been reached, but hasn’t it *always* been breached? If we acknowledge this, doesn’t it allow us to recognize 2 things: first, the national political and economic *policy preferences*, are trimmed to match the requirements of the international market, as we now see as followers of current events; but second, that domestic political and economic systems developed historically in *line* with changes in world productive practices and market forces — again, as a recurrent, typical, and predictable phenomenon.
6. If we say that a ‘system dominant order’ has emerged, are we talking about a new phenomenon, or simply beginning to apply (in a self-congratulatory way) an alternative analytical perspective which has always been available to examine the world system?
7. Is it better to speak of the postwar decline in faith in a liberal order as a response to weaknesses in international organizations engendered by economic turmoil — or should we see this rejection of liberalism and growth of economic nationalism as a phenomena paralleling the decline in U.S. *political* and *military* hegemony?
8. Is the problem that the ‘hidden hand of the international market cannot still the thrust to protectionism and trade war’ — or is the so-called ‘*belle epoque*’ of postwar world trade expansion coterminous with, and virtually indistinguishable from, U.S. imperialism?
9. If there is no reliable methodology to predict system outcomes that will result from this economic turmoil, isn’t this *because* there is usually no overall perspective offered in which to analyze the system as a world-wide phenomena — & instead there is simply the old liberal-

pluralist emphasis on the interaction of so-called separable so-called political and so-called economic so-called forces?

ECONOMIC  
DIPLOMACY &  
THE NEW  
INTERNATIONAL  
ORDER

10. Does the emphasis constantly given to policy prescriptions and policy recommend actions become *ad hoc* irrelevance to the precise extent that it is not grounded in a systematic analysis of the *apparatus* of capitalism as a historically evolving social system at the world level?

Phrases quoted are from Walter Goldstein (Graduate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany)'s "Economic Diplomacy and the New International Order."

bruce andrews

POLI SCI