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POLI SCI

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Representation and Irresponsibility in Foreign Policy [1977]

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Representation and Irresponsibility in American Foreign Policy

[1977]

1.

In American foreign policy the role of the public — the mass public remains a problem. It is thought by some to have been the problem with the interventionary policy of the 1960s. Certainly some of us harbor different dreams today, as we did then. What was to be done? By the mid — 1960s, was it the *institutional structure* which had grown unwieldy.... distant? Was it the lack of responsiveness of executive to legislature, of ruler to ruled, of head to body politic? Did this attenuation of democratic access prove conducive to irresponsibility in the higher circles: for example, to a policy in Indochina which "got out of hand," or which at least went beyond the limits of its rational container? And did this irresponsibility in turn help to attenuate the American body politic itself, consigning it to chronic passivity and occasional spasmodic reactions?

Not the lack of participation, but of representation or accountability.

Disembodiment.

The sublimation of the body politic.

2.

As solutions, we find: a variety of prescriptions. Each is hinged to a different view of the dramas of repre-

Descriptions containing explanations, which in turn imply prescriptions.

sentation and accountability as they apply to the relationship between the public and the state. One is populist. For it, a more direct role and "voice" for the mass public can serve as a beneficial restraint. It envisages the spread of democratic practice — this time, into that most jealously guarded of all state domains: "national security" policy.

By means of a less dominant Executive (an erosion of the prerogatives of the Imperial Presidency) and a stiffened Congress.

Yet is this what is actually desired? Traditional views of the relationship between mass public and ruling elite proceed quite differently. Therefore we need to chart its implications, both in general (on what has become familiar expository terrain) and in regard to the specific preconditions for maintaining a policy of global intervention.

Questions revolving around the "primacy of foreign policy" and the separation of foreign and domestic policy considerations.

3.

Public opinion plays a marginal role. This much is accepted. Variation centers instead around a normative concern: how is this to be regarded?

In a traditional view, the separation between policy and mass public has been cause for *relief*, not for dismay. We are saved from calamity by this lack of mass representation. Expanding public control over security policy would have been ruinous. Vital affairs of state had to continue to be insulated from the sentiments of the mass public. Only in that way could the rationality of the policy-making process be preserved.

A positive stress on executive prerogatives.

Locke an exemplar etc. here — followed by Lippman. Almond, etc.

4.

How is the character of the mass public to be regarded? Here we discover a familiar litany:

It is lacking in knowledge and information.

It is deficient in its attentiveness.

In the electoral arena, party loyalties dominate and little space is left for choices to be guided by preferences on the issues.

Besides, by and large, such policy preferences are ephemeral and uninformed.

The mass electorate's concerns are centered more on domestic matters. International issues are remote. They are also prone to exaggeration.

Public attitudes are oversensitive to changing patterns of events which are beyond their comprehension.

Mood characterizes the quality of these opinions as well as the shifts end volatility among them. In particular, such views are likely to oscillate back end forth between a yearning for isolation and a taste for aggressive overinvolvement.

The authoritarianism found among the working class would also color their response to foreign policy questions. A lack of sophistication remained, even in the sphere where such sophistication was most needed: the use or contemplated use of violence as an instrument of policy.

Hard-line anti-communist attitudes continued to dominate in the mid-1960s, narrowing the flex-

A characteristically punitive reading, especially of the lower middle class and working class.

For example:
"On the rare occasions when it does awaken from its slumber, the mass public, being no more informed than previously, is impulsive, unstable, unreasoning, unpredictable, capable of shifting direction or of going in several contradictory directions at the same time... An air of uncertainty and intolerance is introduced into the 'climate of public opinion".
—James Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (N.Y.: Random House, 1961), p. 36.

This image of a war-like or jingoist working class is an *inversion* of a previous European image of a reluctant or pacifist (and sometimes radical) mass public resisting the blandishments of an expansionist elite. It is also a characteristic and revealing inversion.

ibility of state actors in so far as they were considering more conciliatory policies in instances like Indochina. A proneness toward war or vigorous intervention had been bred in the bone.

5.

The conclusion drawn from such a portrait would be that the mass public should exert only a marginal influence over foreign policy. This implies a need for restrictions on their influence over the means as well as the larger purposes of policy. Their exclusion from the actual formation of postwar policy has run in tandem with this viewpoint, and with the notion that the mass public was incapable of taking on either a larger role or substantially expanded responsibility. It needed to be led and should indeed continue to be led — by the "elite" or educated public and by the leaders. In the speculation of classical theorists as well, this has been a *general* conclusion, unaffected by the kinds of policy under scrutiny. This *generality* is especially worth looking at.

Or did the conclusion precede and help to shape or reinforce the nature of the portrait?

The *discourse* of security policy transcends such a responsiveness, such a public dialogue.

Otherwise, the executors of policy will find themselves paralyzed, unable to apply their expert knowledge.

And with the "nuclearization" (and therefore the "psychologizing") of U.S. policy, a chink in the national armor might register as a chink in the nuclear armor — as a breach in security.

6.

In this traditional conception, an unbridgable gap exists between the educated or elite public on the hand, and the mass public on the other. Only the former are thought to have the characteristics needed to allow for even a limited infusion of democratic norms into the domain of foreign policy. The sentiments of the elite or educated public

could be listened to, with some confidence. It would also act as a buffer against the mass public's more irresponsible and erratic currents.

Yet, as I have argued, this way of characterizing the mass public in the 1960s will not stand. Recent analysis lends to the mass public some of the characteristics which had once been thought to exist only among more elite groups. The portrait of the mass public taken from survey research data in the somnolent 1950s does not fit the evidence from the more politicized 1960s. And we would therefore need to revise the overall conception of public capacity *upward.* Once we have done so, the prescriptive implications will need rethinking as well. The argument that for example one needs to use the better educated or elite public as a "responsible" buffer becomes suspect.

In *Public Constraint and American Policy in Vietnam* (Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, 1976).

Also, see Gerald W. Hopple, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy" (presented at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association).

[Not so unreliable]

These cognitive liabilities have been greatly overstated.

7.

Further, the character of the educated (and middle or upper-middle class) public in the 1960s has been badly gauged. This is particularly true when we look at opinion at the early stages of Americas escalation of the Vietnam war in l964, at a point where such opinion was, at least in comparison with later years, relatively untutored. Did the best educated Americans and those at the upper ends of the social scale exhibit the kind of responsibility which classical theorists would lead us to expect of them? Actually, at this stage, they were the ones who exhibited a lack of sophistication about mili-

Such misreadings, it might seem, are as much the result of wishful or expedient thinking as anything.

[*No.*]

Those most likely to be attracted by

tary force and the dangers of overcommitment. They were the ones most prone to aggressive responses to the threatened collapse of the Saigon regime. In their preferences in regard to the means for achieving American goals, they were *more* likely to be attracted to escalatory options.

Nor did they display the stability in opinion which is said to distinguish them from the more volatile mass. Actually, unlike the mass public, their opinions underwent a massive shift after 1964, from hawkish belligerence to a more skeptical moderation Although official doctrine had remained stable, the shift in media argumentation had been dramatic. And the better-educated and higher income Americans, as a group, overlapped substantially with those who were paying close attention to the media. The change in their opinion — in comparison with the more stable mass views — might therefore be attributable to the effects of the media.

8.

If this is what we mean by responsibility, it is not a responsibility with neutral overtones The attribution of responsibility to such opinions derives instead from the way they mirror the shifts in official policy, or in the media. (*The responsibility of followership?*) Or else its allegedly admirable qualities derive, more broadly, from the way such opinion mirrored the globalist and aggressively interventionist character of U.S. policy toward the

the tougher stance and the escalatory options — in 1952 as well as 1964 — were:

Highly educated,
High income,
White
Protestants, with high attention to the print media.

The opinion shift took place particularly among those paying the most attention to the media:
"the manipulated persons happen to be from the upper middle class masses."
— Richard Hamilton, *Restraining Myths* (New York: Sage Publications and Halsted Press, 1975), p. 20l; stress added.

Or — a responsibility in a camouflaged literal sense: the ability to *respond*?

In 1964, of those expressing opinions, 58 percent of the college edu-

Third World in the l960s. (An "imperial responsibility" — paralleling the allegedly fated or necessary imperial responsibility which the United States had taken on?) Neither of these variants are quite what the traditional conception had in mind — or are they? Perhaps its prescriptions are much less general than is customarily admitted. Perhaps they are much more closely hinged to a particular pattern of U.S. policy *and its political preconditions.*

9.

Going beyond the general character of its opinion and its electoral activity, the mass public displays a much different pattern in regard to Indochina policy during this same period. Those segments of the public most interested in the options of withdrawal and deescalation in 1964 were actually more likely to occupy the lower ends of the social scale and the more peripheral regions of the American political universe.

These same groups — the poor, the working class, nonwhites, women, the elderly — also exhibited a larger tendency toward *isolationism,* a tendency within which their specific choices on Vietnam appear to fit. This shows up in a general reluctance to accept the risks of armed conflict, in a greater fear of war, in a failure to see the relevance of expansive internationalist concerns to their personal situation, in a more inward-looking perspective, and in a priority given to domestic concerns

cated and 56 percent of those with incomes of $10,000 or over favored taking a stronger stand in Vietnam. Among Protestants in this income range, the figure rises to 78 percent. And, within this category, it exceeds 80 percent for the ones paying close attention to newspapers and magazines.
(see Hamilton, *cited,* pp. 194-200)

More complicated than simple followership. Rather, a social structural cleavage of a kind which was thought not to exist.

[Scapegoating.]

Of respondents expressing an opinion in 1964, only 40 percent of those with incomes of $6,000 and under favored a stronger stand; and of those with less than 12 years of education, only 37 percent did. The rest from those categories — that is to say, a majority — favored either an American pullout or an effort to end the fighting.
(computed from figures in Hamilton, pp. 194-5)

"Poorer and less-well educated Americans, in other words, were more likely to express dovish sentiments, They were not [at this point] as likely to support u.s. interventionism, and they were more likely to oppose it."
— *Public Constraint,* cited, p. 39.

This reluctance in the face of foreign

and domestic changes. On the other hand, the "restrained" nature of elite opinion arose only later in the involvement, in 1967 and 1968, as the elite public gradually swung around to views which important (and denigrated) portions of the mass public had projected from the beginning.

10.

Even so, some have argued that American leaders' actual policy was designed as a response to mass constraint, that it was grounded in a fear that failure, withdrawal or conciliation in Indochina were unacceptable to the American people. To embark in these policy directions would only result in calamity: taking the form of electoral punishment, mass backlash, disaffection, delegitimation or a poisoning of the American political atmosphere.

One can counter this. Particularly in the early period of the escalation of the war, the mass public was simply not engaged enough to pose an enormous problem or a serious constraint "downward." At times, in 1964 and 1965, policymakers registered an awareness of this. Actually, if a constraint existed at that point, it was a constraint "upward" rather than downward — a constraint on escalation, rather than deescalation. The mass public (and, at that juncture, the mass electorate) was, if anything, reluctant. And the overcoming of that reluctance was felt as a policy problem — a desired *achievement*. No "chafing at the bit" appears. An "educational campaign" had to be

expansion and intervention continues to appear in a variety of poll findings, well into the 1970s. It seems to reflect a much less well defined appreciation of America's foreign interests, and of the seamless interdependence which has informed the heart of the official postwar U.S. vision.

The idea that there was a political *imperative* behind the escalations, and, accordingly, that the mass public might be held responsible for these official actions. Responsibility is in this way shifted away from the state actors themselves and also away from the taken-for-granted character of a continuing policy.

Official discussions in September 1964 spoke of "a unity of domestic American opinion in support of such presidentially authorized" strikes as a precondition. During the November debates, "it is openly conceded that such [escalatory] action is likely to evoke opposition in both domestic and international public opinion."
— *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel Edition, Vol. III, p. 116.

launched — one which in retrospect seems to have included the Tonkin Gulf incident — before a comfortable cushion of mass acceptance was to appear.

But does this worry over backlash appear later? Perhaps it takes its shape from the gathering escalation itself. *Once* the mass public has come to embrace the outlines of policy, we find that it does arise — in some form, if not in the form envisaged. But still, the evidence on public attitudes reveals no fervent clinging to particular foreign policy *goals* in the absence of official backing. Instead, when we come to these goals, we find a rather permissive and acquiescent mass.

11.

Then is it the *means* of U.S. policy around which the public constructs its famous system of confining dikes? This would make more sense. Let us frame it more exactly to clarify a few of its implications.

A relatively domestically-oriented or isolationist public would, expectedly, be more prone to attach itself to a "WIN" strategy in a situation like that of Indochina: to "get off and get out," or, if not that, to get out *tout court.* This would especially true of a public which was not well-educated or was unsophisticated in its handling of official notions about military doctrine and global risks. Once the mass public had accepted the official definition of U.S.

Still, deliberations in 1964 and 1965 were taking place within a fairly comfortably consensual framework.

Not a pressure system.

Not a Roll-back sentiment.

Instead: a diluted accountability in regard to official definitions of security.

As the November 1964 NSC Working Group noted:

"As we saw in Korea, an 'in-between' course of action will always arouse a school of thought that believes things should be tackled quickly and conclusively. On the other side, the continuation of military action and a reasonably firm posture will arouse sharp criticism in other political quarters."
— *Pentagon Papers,* Vol. III, p. 617.

interests (something which they were more reluctant or less concerned about doing in the war's early stages), they would prove less willing to accept a limited war strategy. In this orientation, they provided a constraint on the *means* of policy. A strong constraint of this sort would not necessarily preclude a more conciliatory strategy aimed at negotiation, if such a strategy projected an alternative conception of American aims and interests. But it might well preclude a protracted war, fought disproportionately with their own casualties.

[IMPATIENCE]

Even the mass public's anti-communism can be interpreted as a version of isolationism.

Thus, it is misleading to draw an empirical connection between the isolationism/ internationalism and the hawk/ dove divisions of opinion.

Where does this leave the previous and assured negativism about the role of the mass public? First, the hesitation over letting the mass public determine the means of policy — the means appropriate to achieving a taken-for-granted set of policy goals — finds some backing. These calibrations of actions to goals may, with much justification, remain in the hands of the state actors. Beyond this, varying degrees of public access will seem appropriate — depending upon the situation and upon the political capacities of the mass public in making specific demands and having those demands patterned in an institutional way.

On the formulation of specific means, the mass will require expert guidance.

The problem of too many hands on the lever, as distinct from which lever to choose, as distinct from when and why the lever should be chosen at all.

12.

More significantly, in the realm of *ends* and in the domain in which policy ends are determined, the mass public's role as culprit appears to have been dramatically (and again, expediently) overplayed.

The play of competing forces might be tolerated because it does not confront the limits of policy, which are presupposed.

Here we go *beneath* the level of technical rationality to the social context in which a relationship of *appropriateness* would exist: between the ends of policy and the underlying domestic social purposes to which they are instrumental. This "second order" relationship of social ends and policy directions (recast as social means) would be open to the political involvement of the mass public.

Yet at this level, mass views and reflexes do not appear to pose the biggest problems. Their interventionism, their acceptance of imperial goals for the United States, formed a shallow current. Would they have resisted an officially-projected alternative conception of American aims and interests? Persuasive evidence for this (commonly accepted) idea remains lacking. Mass opinion was not so much a pressure or demand as a contingent phenomenon, dependent on the cues and coaxings of the state elite. It might well have accepted another relationship between domestic social purposes and global role. For those intent on a transformation of American aims toward a *less*-interventionary stance, they might well have seemed part of the solution, rather than part of the problem.

Unless the policy can persuasively be regarded as an instance of national defense, as the intervention in Vietnam in 1964-65 could not be, does any obvious reason exist for excluding the mass public from influence over the choice of policy *ends*? Or at least, does any reason exist apart from a taken-

But with military policy, severe *tactical* limits exist as well. This is distinctive. The legal or constitutional system does not help to delimit tactical choices in the foreign policy realm as it does domestically.

Even so, leaders must be led.

The socialization of the public.

A rather deferential mass public can be seen to exist in the 1960s, in spite of the more isolationist preferences which it expressed.

In capability, it differed from the public of the 1950s. But also, it differed substantially from the suspicious and less-well-anchored public of the 1970s.

for-granted commitment to a certain range of internationalist aims and the fear that the mass public might "lapse" into an irresponsible isolationism? In their relationship to democratic theory, are foreign policies which have little to do with a circumspectly-defined concept of national security really radically different from domestic social policies? Certainly, at least in the past, these domestic spheres were ones in which the role of mass demands had gained much greater acceptance and legitimacy. Yet the two spheres have always been thought to be different, even when the claims of foreign policy went well beyond the protection of the nation's sovereignty and territory, and therefore well beyond the point where domestic debate might have seemed irrelevant. The jealous way in which the choice of larger foreign policy goals has been guarded in the postwar period only underscores this point, and this difference.

Masses never appear to choose, or to articulate preferences. On the contrary, they "lapse."

On what grounds should the public be excluded from the rank ordering of broad foreign policy goals?

Depoliticization — an additional requirement for a strategy of crisis-avoidance ?

Do not underplay the decisional autonomy of state actors in the face of societal groups, especially when it comes to security policy.

But also: do not forget that this autonomy has internal political coordinates and preconditions. These are neither assured, nor permanent.

13.

We can go further. In the postwar period, preventing the mass public from exerting significant influence over policy goals went hand in hand with the creation of a unique *constellation of political forces* in regard to security issues.

In particular, influence on the part of the public was subsumed within the creation of a bipartisan internationalist coalition in the late 1940s — one which persisted well into the years of the

[The "imperial alliance"]

In 1948, by jettisoning the left wing

Indochina war. To have dramatically increased the scope of mass influence would have either required going outside the bounds of this coalition, or would have weakened its cohesion. The state actors orchestrated a rough agreement on America's goals, and gradually located themselves on the common ground between a Democratic constituency on the one hand (with its ties to organized labor as well as to the oligopoly or internationally-oriented sectors of the business class) and the more limitationist, fiscally-conservative Republican elements on the other. The history of this coalition, of its increasing solidity and breakaway elements, would be a history of the domestic political basis of the American empire — yet to be written.

As America's global stance took form, these latter segments of the coalition embraced the consensus once concessions were made through a parallel emphasis on containment in Asia. Such concessions made an evenhanded globalism somewhat harder to sustain. The former segments were kept within the coalition in part because of the state actors' acceptance of a commitment to continuous economic growth, which would in turn insure the possibility of a sizable "fiscal skim-off" for domestic social legislation. There were other side payments, some of which involved the intangible aspects of symbolic reassurance condensation symbols, national pride. Anti-communism, liberal mission, and the claims of national security and national "self-image" provided the glue.

of the Democratic party, as well as the conservative South, a "smallest winning coalition" was pieced together electorally.

Partisan differences were fought out on several terrains: first, over isolation/internationalism; second, over nuclear policy; third, over counter-insurgency and limited war.

A subsiding split: a sectoral conflict between more conservative interest-group orientations and more nationally or systemically-oriented liberals.

Yet not just a surface idealist change in thinking; a reflection of underlying changes in American society.

[Conservative prerogatives]

Growth imperative: legitimation, and the "political business cycle."

Insures mass loyalty, the protection of profitability, and the defusing of social tensions.

Public impression management. Amnesia.

They offered a way of overcoming

14.

Such coalitions are not free-standing. With a loose web of agreements and shared perceptions cast over its disparate elements, an institutional foundation was needed. On foreign policy issues, a particular *state structure* proved helpful in keeping it solidified. In addition, the state structure as well as the coalition structure kept key policy matters insulated and out of the hands of the general public, This pertained not only to the choice of means, but also to the process by which ends were determined and critically evaluated.

A full listing of the elements of this structure, as it pertained to policies like those in Indochina, would include the following:

(A) A slow withering up of countervailing power on the part of the legislative branch, proceeding hand in hand with the slow erosion of isolationist Republican sentiment in the halls of Congress — an "educational" achievement for which the Eisenhower administration is often given credit). This shifted the responsibility for America's policy goals away from the institutions most open to organized public or interest group pressures. It was a trend applauded by those who worried over restraints on the development of a more "progressive," if more expansive and expensive policy stance — whether those restraints came from radicals, isolationists or military Neandrathals.

the contradictory nature of group interests, helped to legitimate the coalition and confer additional advantages on it.

A high level of consensus, embodied in the Postwar coalition, made a high level of central control politically feasible. And the latter reinforced the former.

State structure as a Structural solution — a way of meeting the problem of incomplete consensus.

It would help this coalition fend off attacks, making it more difficult for an alternative coalition (for example, a populist/isolationist grouping) to have been constructed. In a different context, Peter Gourevitch's argument follows a similar logic; see his paper "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty" (delivered to the International Studies Association, February 1975).

[The Chastened Periphery]

Also, the site of isolationist sentiment which would otherwise hold *any* President, but especially a liberal President, hostage.

A weakening of accountability, along with a loosening of the "deadlock of democracy."

(B) Throughout the Cold War period, a growing consolidation of power in the hands of the Executive branch developed in tandem with these changes in the role of Congress. Applauded by liberals in the early 1960s as a counterweight to an overly cautious and nonreformist Congress, this took on the trappings of the Imperial Presidency in later years. In doing so, it carried with it certain dangers from the standpoint of insuring technical rationality: that America's policy might come to reflect or be inflected by the "Imperial Personality" — in the cases of Johnson and Nixon; or that those tending the institutions of government, basking in their power and autonomy, might lose touch with the public and thereby undercut its assurances of support and legitimacy. At the time of the first dramatic escalations of the war, however, these problems did not loom large. Instead, the advantages of a powerful executive seemed apparent.

Not an uncommon relationship: between foreign expansion or the taking on of imperial responsibilities and the aggrandizement of executive power at the expense of legislative or popular control.

In a generally more fragmented political system, like that of the United States, greater Executive power was needed — not simply to create a "coherent, orderly" policy process, but to underprop this coalition.

[From Camelot to Agonized Nixon]

The policy: Presidentialized and Bureaucratized.

Also, leading to a weakening of constitutional constraint and legality in general.

(C) Other elements of the political system and structure provided additional barriers to public access. Bi-partisanship effectively took many of the most potentially contentious issues involved in security policy out of the realm of political debate. The mass public was therefore unable to use a *partisan* platform for launching demands of an anti-interventionist or conciliatory variety throughout the Cold War period. Nor would "political entrepreneurs" have found it easy to use this platform for mobilizing mass support and articulating a dif-

[Ceremonial competition]

Gradually, the internationalist coalition came to dominate both parties, They had been given the first boost by Roosevelt and World War Two, which helped discredit the anti-interventionists.

ferent stance. This went hand in hand with the trajectory of the Democratic party from the "purge" of its left wing by the Cold War-liberals in the late 1940s, followed by its acquiescence in the official viewpoint. This pattern continued up until the slow-motion breakup of the liberal camp in the late 1960s, prefigured by the lone votes against the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution before being given voice by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in early 1966, and fueled by the shifts in the media in the business community and in the primary campaigns of 1968 as well as by the larger public forces they both mobilized and responded to.

For the Democratic party would have been the logical platform for articulating the reluctance found at the periphery.

The parallel development of anti-communism and bi-partisanship.

15.

State structure therefore acted as a bulwark against access in the early years of the escalation. By keeping this access limited, a variety of functions could be served. In the 1964-l965 period, the case of Indochina displays the successful workings of this insulated state structure and of this relatively cohesive political coalition.

Institutional fragmentation or a lack of societal Coherence did not prove to be major problems in the beginning.

Nor was there an underdeveloped administrative system presenting severe limits to society's steering capacity in regard to foreign policy,

In contrast by the l970s these functions could no longer be painlessly achieved: with the debacle of Vietnam, the debasing of the currency of "national security," the rise to prominence of more divisive foreign economic issues, the apparent decline in the utility of military force applied in unstable Third World settings, the growing awareness of the tradeoffs and conflicts which could be posed

At the time of the escalations, a "rationality crisis" did not appear.

Later the Process had become more "allocative" — where the state faced diverse and competitive demands and where it could, or was forced to, derive its guidelines for policy from "politics."

between international and domestic priorities At times these functions could not be achieved at all. The once-stable relationships began to break down, both at the level of technical rationality (the choice of policy means to maximize previously-decided-upon-ends) and of domestic social context (the relationship between broader policy goals and underlying domestic purposes and interests). At the very least, these relationships became more fragile, more open to contrary influences.

In the earlier Period the barriers against the representation of a fore isolationist and more conciliatory orientation on the part of the domestic "periphery" enabled the state:

(A) To provide policymakers with remarkable latitude as they confronted a permissive public which grounded itself on traditions of followership — as leaders choreographed the movements of official policy in the face of a receptive and uncritical audience.

(B) To maintain a liberal internationalist and interventionist orientation in policy without accruing any substantial political risks in the process,

(C) To protect a hegemonic international stance, contingent more upon the permissiveness of the global than of the domestic political environment. This leeway was protected, even though such a stance looked much more adept at protecting the

Johan Galtung "Foreign Policy as a Function of Social Position" *Journal of Peace Research* 3-4 (1964), p. 231: "let us summarize conditions that would contribute to a stable, peace-oriented and effective public opinion in the field of foreign policy:
"1. Elimination of the periphery [those of lower status, those less well-informed] from influence on foreign policy, for instance through a party-structure that does not adequately reflect periphery foreign policy orientations."
Although an alternative reading of the evidence would dispute the "peace-oriented" dimension (see *Public Constraint* for such a reading), the argument about "stability" can be sustained once it is clear how conservative an argument this really is.

The relationship between the state's domestic and international roles.

System-wide concerns, such as that of maximizing the deterrent.

[Selectivity of effect]

[Differential benefit]

Not necessarily a "public good" or

interests of the business class than at proving accountable to the needs of the general public, the working class, the poor, etc. That is to say, closing off certain channels of access helped to safeguard the *partiality* of policy at the same time as its neutrality was officially proclaimed. It helped maintain a system of *nondecision*-making, a particular mobilization of bias.

(D) Finally, these barriers helped keep security from becoming *domesticated* — that is, from being regarded as similar in structure to a domestic social policy and therefore treated accordingly at a *political* level. It forestalled the day when it might come to be regarded as something which competed with domestic concerns, or which ought ideally to reflect those concerns and the constellation of domestic political forces which underlay them. It delayed the point where a "domestication" which exists conceptually (or as part of an analyst's explanation) would come to exist politically (as part of the understandings shared by the mass public). The increasingly artificial distinctions between "high" and "low" policy, between domestic and international concerns were reinforced.

16.

This brings us full circle. The political basis of the 1964 and 1965 foreign policy system proved incapable of being maintained. Its functions began to give way:

the expression of "generalizable interests".

Such partiality presented political problems. It had to be veiled.

Limitations on the democratic control of foreign Policy, going so far as the exclusion of mass preferences, provided a way of reducing the capacities of those groups whose interests or preferences were underrepresented.

[Where the linkages became apparent]

Americans may not be accustomed to this brand of "high politics," a fact which foreign policy spokesmen have at times stylishly lamented. Yet the choice of global role required such an acceptance,

In the glare of critical scrutiny;

In the face of a revival of popular concern with foreign policy issues and of the public's new ability of *linking* foreign with domestic priorities;

Of the defection of portions of a previously secure support on the part of the elite and educated public;

Of the rise of an anti-interventionist and protectionist sentiment which punctured a liberal imperial consensus that had already been stretched thin;

Of the further rise of issue voting and the erosion of party loyalties, which thereby made the bipartisan "container" that much more fragile and opened the consensus to new conflicts;

Of the flexing of Congressional muscles, in response to the growth of Executive power and the atrophy of legislative control;

Of a general, if temporary disaffection with governmental institutions on the part of the general public;

And of the rise of serious international constraints — here, in particular, we might mention the heightening of the difficulties involved in marshalling military force, the weakening in the position of the dollar and the deterioration in America's balance of payments position, and the growth of more plural and destabilizing forces within the Western alliance structure.

Therefore, if we are to speak of enlarging the scope of public representation, we must acknowledge this backdrop. If that scope were to be enlarged in

The withholding of information had been important as in 1964, even where such active exclusions were couched in other terms (deriving from the inability of the mass public to understand the complex "necessities" of international life).

With the Cold War "lid" having been substantially removed, the process of domestication accelerated.
Even during a period of U.S. assertiveness (1963-1968) the nation's "advantage" in "domestic policy base" was said to be declining. Conservative opinion-makers would speak of the 1960s in terms of a U.S. "disadvantage". — See, for example, Z, Brzezinski, "How the Cold War Was Played," *Foreign Affairs* (October 19?2)

A policy for which depoliticization was a precondition helped to weaken that very depoliticization.

A more plural international order was also likely to be more domesticated

Wasn't one precondition of restricted public access — of the ability of state actors to avoid having issues being domesticated in divisive ways —- a willingness on the part of America's allies to abide by a hegemonic liberal order?

Thus, it may be true, but in a differ-

conjunction with this *already weakened* political coalition and an *already embattled* state structure, the consequences appear quite different than they would have in the 1960s. It is no longer a question of increasing constraints or of compounding the asymmetry between open and closed political systems. Instead, the preconditions for maintaining a liberal imperial policy orientation may be at stake.

Could this be the real danger implied in increasing the access of the mass public? If so, arguments against such an increase should not be couched in terms of some broad incapacity on the part of the mass public or the risks of some "objectively" irresponsible intrusion on their part. Rather, the issue should revolve around a quite different point: the way in which "incapacity" and "irresponsibility" are conceived. These are political conceptions, reflecting a significant conflict of interests or divergence of concerns. The mass public's incapacity nay only reflect their unwillingness to remain within the world of the mid-1960s, or to extend their hand (with their blank check in it) toward policymakers intent on maintaining an ambitiously interventionist policy.

17.

The prescriptive implications we draw from a portrait of the mass public no longer look quite the same. No longer do they inhabit the rarefied atmosphere of classical democratic theory. Instead, they involve the specific connection between

ent sense than the one intended, that: "the prevalence of the mass public's passive mood introduces a factor of stability into the foreign policy-making process."
— Rosenau, *cited.* p. 37.

The stability, however, is specific to a particular range of policies.

"The policy of maintaining the status quo entails the immobilization of the populace."
— James Petras.

Depoliticization does relate to nuclearization (a formal element — the facts of life and deterrence in a nuclear age) but it also relates to a specific societal content.

These formal elements are not autonomous. They are intertwined with, and constituted by, a social content.

expanding the scope of representation and forcing changes in the character of policy. Had the representation of mass preferences been increased in the earlier period, wouldn't the choice of official goals have been more restrained? Would it have encouraged a shift away from a pattern of globalist intervention in cases where national security did not appear to be at stake? This link needs emphasis: between excluding the public from the determination of ends and safe-guarding the continuation of America's postwar hegemonic role.

This policy-specific relationship should occupy the foreground with the relationship between the role of the public and some general implications for the quality or rationality of any foreign Policy remaining in the background Unfortunately, it is this a-political background which has received most of the attention. It is as though the character of desired policy had been so taken-for-granted for so long, that is problematic nature and specific political preconditions had ceased to be visible. These dimensions were simply assumed away in the discussions of "rationality" and the ways of insuring it. However, like the concept of "the national interest," the notion of rationality too often serves to submerge our awareness of these latent political conflicts and differences of interest. In fact, the intrusion of the mass public is said to threaten the technical rationality of policy in part, one can argue. because of the divergence between the scope of taken-for-granted goals and the preferences of that public. It remains a social and

It becomes difficult to complain about the dominance of a particular elite or coalition and yet argue for another, more responsible elite. Historically, the content and form are interdependent.

Rationality — one requirement for which was the separation of the administrative and political spheres,

It threatens the "craftsmanlike conformity" of state policy to established interests.

political question and not simply a technical one.

18.

To the extent that blocking the representation (or insinuation) of mass concerns in the foreign policy arena is *functional*, the space actually given to that representation will not be determined autonomously. It will instead be *dependent* on that for which the blocking is functional.

Just as the state structure itself may be functional or dependent — in regard to a property order, a set of shared values and beliefs, etc.

It is part of an interdependent system.

And, in this case, it is fair to say that the blocking has not merely been functional for the "quality" or "rationality" of the policy process. Rather, it has been a domestic political precondition for the continued stability of a specific pattern of policy: a liberal internationalist orientation, with a penchant for foreign intervention and massive military budgets. And, in turn, this orientation has been thought to be a precondition for reproducing a specific pattern of domestic social life — for following the rules of a *specific* domestic "paradigm." If this mass public representation had been increased without other "compensating changes," one of the props of America's postwar hegemonic role would have been kicked out from under it. And, in turn, this would have had a bearing on the reproduction and steering of the domestic social system. In this light, the arguments for expanding or contracting the role of the mass public or the representation of its preferences seem much less general. Their air of neutrality begins to be dispelled. On the contrary, they appear much more

The actual structure may be occluded, even while it is being reproduced.

Such a paradigm may not be embodied in politics in any explicit way. The latency of politics, or the subordination of politics to administration, may be a precondition of its successful functioning.

State structure, as well as a particular policy, may express a partiality or selectivity of effect simply by expressing previous political victories.

contingent and secondary, much more imbued with the coloring of politics and of social conflict.

It would therefore have to be decoded. denaturalized, "defamiliarized."